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ABSTRACT 
Campus sexual assault grievance procedures, governed by Title IX, have 
become a hotspot for recent debates about the contours of due process on college 
campuses.  The Obama administration substantially revised Title IX grievance 
procedures to encourage reporting and adjudication of campus sexual assaults.  Less 
than a decade later, the Trump administration rolled out its own Title IX guidance to 
undo many of those requirements, in the name of enhancing due process protections 
for accused students.  One particularly controversial new requirement in the 2020 
Title IX regulations is for adversarial cross-examination.  This Comment argues that 
adversarial cross-examination in campus sexual assault adjudications is not required 
by due process and undermines the mandate of Title IX.  Indirect, non-adversarial 
cross-examination would sufficiently protect the due process rights of accused 
students while also ensuring that accusing students are not re-traumatized by the 
adjudication process.  
INTRODUCTION 
There is a crisis regarding sexual assault on college campuses—but just what 
that crisis is, exactly, depends on whom you ask.  One side points to oft-cited 
evidence that sexual assault occurs all too frequently on college campuses1 and often 
either is not addressed at all or is handled poorly.2  In response to these failures, the 
Obama administration substantially enhanced its Title IX guidance through a Dear 
Colleague Letter issued in 2011, with an aim toward providing greater protection for 
                                                                                                     
 1.  See, e.g., Heather M. Karjane et al., Sexual Assault on Campus: What Colleges and Universities 
Are Doing About It, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Dec. 2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/205521.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6LVX-B54G] (estimating that “one in five young women experiences rape during 
college”); RAINN, Campus Sexual Violence: Statistics, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/campus-sexual-
violence [https://perma.cc/5Z5E-B96F] (last visited Nov. 11, 2020) [hereinafter RAINN, Campus 
Sexual Violence].  These statistics have been criticized as overreporting the prevalence of campus sexual 
assault.  See, e.g., New DOJ Data on Sexual Assaults: College Students are Actually Less Likely to be 
Victimized, THE FEDERALIST (Dec. 11, 2014), https://thefederalist.com/2014/12/11/new-doj-data-on-
sexual-assaults-college-students-are-actually-less-likely-to-be-victimized/ [https://perma.cc/3U92-
S4BP]; Libby Nelson, ‘1 in 5’: How a Study of 2 Colleges Became the Most Cited Campus Sexual 
Assault Statistic, VOX, (Dec. 11, 2014, 2:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2014/12/11/7377055/campus-
sexual-assault-statistics [https://perma.cc/ZN66-49EQ].  But see Charlene L. Muehlenhard et al., 
Evaluating the One-in-Five Statistic: Women’s Risk of Sexual Assault While in College, 54:4-5 J. OF SEX 
RES. 549, 566 (2017) (“Many women are sexually assaulted while in college.  Based on a review of the 
studies that most directly addressed this question, one in five (20%) is a reasonable estimate of the 
percentage of undergraduate women sexually assaulted while in college.”). 
 2.  See, e.g., Kelley A. Behre, Ensuring Choice and Voice for Campus Sexual Assault Victims: A 
Call for Victims’ Attorneys, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 293, 319 (2017) (“Although the precise percentage of 
cases in which students are found responsible for sexual misconduct is unknown, a recent survey found 
that one-third of colleges and universities have never expelled a student for sexual misconduct.”); 
Deborah L. Brake, Fighting the Rape Culture Wars Through the Preponderance of the Evidence 
Standard, 78 MONT. L. REV. 109, 113 (2017) (“In addition to the harm inflicted by the assault itself, 
there are harms from the institutional failures of colleges and universities to adequately respond to 
reports of sexual assault.  Many survivors experience such institutional betrayal that they feel they have 
no choice but to leave their institutions, either by transferring to another school, often with loss of 
academic credit and money, or dropping out of college entirely.”). 
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survivors.3  On the other side, though, a vocal minority argue that the pendulum has 
swung too far, and that now universities are discriminating against male students 
accused of sexual assault, unfairly using Title IX as a cudgel to violate the due 
process rights of men.4  This debate has come to a head over the issue of whether 
adversarial cross-examination should be required during Title IX grievance 
procedures, culminating in a nearly simultaneous circuit split and flip-flop by the 
Department of Education with respect to Title IX guidance and regulations.  
Cross-examination is often referred to as the “greatest legal engine” for truth 
seeking5 in the criminal and civil systems.  It makes sense, then, that it has been 
imported in various permutations into the school disciplinary process realm.  But, 
because cross-examination too often weaponizes rape myths to erroneously 
undermine the credibility of accusers, adversarial cross-examination actually 
solidifies the harms of campus sexual assault, while achieving only minimal truth-
seeking value and therefore failing to ensure due process either for accusing or 
accused students.  Both the Title IX regulations promulgated in 2020 and recent split 
between the First and Sixth Circuits deal directly with this issue, making it ripe for 
clarification both judicially and administratively.6  
Part I of this Comment examines Title IX’s evolution to cover campus sexual 
assault and explores both the harms of campus sexual assault and the reasons why it 
remains underreported.  Part II examines the role of the Office for Civil Rights in 
shaping and enforcing universities’ obligations under Title IX, due process 
protections in school disciplinary decisions, cross-examination and the ways in 
which it has failed to serve as an engine for truth-seeking in the sexual misconduct 
context, and the split between the First and Sixth Circuits over whether adversarial 
cross-examination is required in school disciplinary proceedings.  Part III is a 
focused analysis of adversarial cross-examination under the Mathews v. Eldridge 
framework.  This Part argues that the adversarial cross-examination in Title IX 
grievance procedures is not required by due process and, if implemented, will deter 
reporting of sexual assault and will further sex-based discrimination on campus, in 
                                                                                                     
 3.  Letter from Russlynn Ali, Asst. Sec’y for C.R., to Colleagues, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., OFF. C.R. 
2 (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q28W-RJ9L] [hereinafter 2011 Dear Colleague Letter]; Tanya Somanader, President 
Obama Launches the “It’s On Us” Campaign to End Sexual Assault on Campus, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Sept. 19, 2014, 2:40 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov 
/blog/2014/09/19/president-obama-launches-its-us-campaign-end-sexual-assault-campus 
[https://perma.cc/TLQ4-FFEX]. 
 4.  Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Higher Education Discriminates Against Men, But Title IX Complaints 
May Change That, USA TODAY (Feb. 12, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion 
/2019/02/12/colleges-universities-discriminate-men-title-ix-complaints-toxic-masculinity-
column/2831834002/ [https://perma.cc/JQ95-XQD3]; Allie Grasgreen, Going on Offense With Title IX, 
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/08/09/accused-rape-
men-allege-discrimination-under-title-ix [https://perma.cc/S4GD-Y78J]. 
 5.  See Jules Epstein, Cross-Examination: Seemingly Ubiquitous, Purportedly Omnipotent, and 
“At Risk,” 14 WIDENER L. REV. 427, 427 (2009) (citation omitted).  
 6.  Although constitutional due process applies only to public universities, Title IX applies to 
virtually all higher education institutions, both public and private.  Therefore, although the circuit split 
due process question applies only to public universities, the larger issue of Title IX’s obligations 
imposed on all recipients of federal funding with respect to grievance procedures applies almost 
universally. 
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direct contravention of Title IX’s mandates.  Instead, a less adversarial indirect form 
of cross-examination meets the goals of all parties in fairly adjudicating Title IX 
cases without subjecting complaining students to a hostile environment.  
I. TITLE IX AND CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT 
A. Title IX’s Evolution to Cover Campus Sexual Assault 
Title IX was passed in 1972, in the wake of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 
1964,7 to bar sex-based discrimination in education.8  The purpose of the legislation 
was twofold—first, to prohibit the use of federal resources to carry out sex-based 
discriminatory practices; and second, to provide protection for individuals victimized 
by such practices.9  Additionally, it reflects a recognition that “sex discrimination . . 
. has historically impeded women’s equal access to education.”10  The statute is 
succinct, reading:   
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any education program or activity receiving Federal assistance.11 
The brevity of the Act belies its complexity.  Title IX has come to apply “to a 
host of activities and programs within higher education, including admissions and 
financial aid, sexual harassment, and athletics.”12  If a student suffers from sexual 
harassment that impacts “[her] ability to access her education” in a negative way, she 
may have a cause of action under Title IX.13  Because receipt of federal funding is 
conditioned upon compliance with the statute,14 Title IX applies to nearly all colleges 
and universities in the United States.15 
Although Title IX was written with gender neutral language, at the time of its 
passage it was understood specifically to prohibit sex-based discrimination against 
women, and for the first twenty years of its existence all cases brought under the 
                                                                                                     
 7.  The legislation was initially introduced as “the Women’s Equality Act of 1971 (Title IX) in 
order to extend the provisions of the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts to cover instances of sex 
discrimination and to strengthen the existing civil rights legislation.”  Paul C. Sweeney, Abuse Misuse & 
Abrogation of the Use of Legislative History: Title IX & Peer Sexual Harassment, 66 UMKC L. REV. 
41, 54 (1997). 
 8.  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). 
 9.  Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979) (holding that Title IX provides a private 
right of action for individuals against their schools in some circumstances). 
 10.  Naomi M. Mann, Taming Title IX Tensions, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 634 (2018). 
 11.  § 1681(a). 
 12.  Matthew R. Triplett, Sexual Assault on College Campuses: Seeking the Appropriate Balance 
Between Due Process and Victim Protection, 62 DUKE L.J. 487, 495 (2012). 
 13.  Mann, supra note 10, at 641 (noting that “one instance of sexual assault may be sufficient to 
constitute sexual harassment, if it is ‘sufficiently severe.’  The complainant must allege (and 
demonstrate, in order to prevail) that the sexual assault negatively affected her education.”). 
 14.  § 1681(a). 
 15.  Katie Jo Baumgardner, Resisting Rulemaking: Challenging the Montana Settlement’s Title IX 
Sexual Harassment Blueprint, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1813, 1814 (2014) (“Every university and 
college across the nation – with the exception of three – accepts federal financial assistance.”). 
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statute were brought by women.16  In 1994 the Second Circuit construed Title IX as 
a gender neutral statute that allows men to bring claims.17  However, in 94% of cases 
the victim is female and in 99% of cases the alleged perpetrator is male.18  Because 
of these stark gender differences, and the ways in which gender norms have shaped 
the adjudication of sexual assaults both on campuses and in the larger legal system, 
this Comment uses gendered language and refers generally to Title IX complainants 
as female and accused students as male. 
Title IX was written broadly, and through advocacy, agency interpretation, and 
judicial decisions has come to encompass peer sexual assault,19 bringing colleges 
into the uncomfortable dual role of investigator and adjudicator for often 
complicated cases.20  This evolution was in large part driven by the feminist 
movement’s push for increased societal recognition that sexual violence was a 
pervasive and highly consequential aspect of women’s lives, which had a detrimental 
impact on their educational pursuits.21  Title IX’s primary purpose is “to protect and 
promote equal educational opportunity for all students, including both the alleged 
perpetrators and the victims of gender-based violence.”22  At its core, Title IX 
recognizes the right of all students to be free from sex-based discrimination in 
                                                                                                     
 16.  Peggy Venetis, Misrepresenting Well-Settled Jurisprudence: Peddling “Due Process” Clause 
Fallacies to Justify Gutting Title IX Protections for Girls and Women, 40 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 126, 
135 (2018).  
 17.  Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 716 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a male student accused of 
sexual assault may bring a Title IX claim to challenge alleged gender bias in the school’s disciplinary 
process). 
 18.  Confronting Campus Sexual Assault: An Examination of Higher Education Claims, UNITED 
EDUCATORS, 3-4, (2015), http://www.ncdsv.org/ERS_Confronting-Campus-Sexual-Assault_2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NW95-K6R6]. 
 19.  Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads in the Sand: Lack of Knowledge, Knowledge 
Avoidance, and the Persistent Problem of Campus Peer Sexual Violence, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 205, 225 
(2011); see also Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Sex Bureaucracy, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 
(Jan. 6, 2017), http://www.chronicle.com/article/The-College-Sex-Bureaucracy/238805 
[https://perma.cc/A96F-F26D] (“Today the phrase ‘Title IX complaint’ commonly refers to an 
allegation of sexual misconduct by one college student against another, but this view was alien at the 
time of the law’s enactment.”).  The Office for Civil Rights, which administers Title IX, first asserted 
that Title IX had jurisdiction over complaints of sexual harassment in an August 1981 policy 
memorandum.  Sweeney, supra note 7, at 70.  The Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in 1992.  
Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 63, 76 (1992) (judicially construing a private cause 
of action for monetary damages under Title IX in cases of sexual harassment of a student by a teacher). 
 20.  One recent study found that forty-three percent of Title IX coordinators both conducted 
investigations and adjudicated the final decisions in those cases.  Jacquelyn D. Wiersma-Mosley & 
James DiLoreto, The Role of Title IX Coordinators on College and University Campuses, 8 BEHAV. 
SCI., Apr. 5, 2018, at 1, 7. 
 21.  Nancy Chi Cantalupo, For the Title IX Civil Rights Movement: Congratulations and Cautions, 
125 YALE L.J. F. 281, 284 (2016) [hereinafter Cantalupo, Congratulations and Cautions]; Alexandra 
Brodsky & Elizabeth Deutsch, The Promise of Title IX: Sexual Violence and the Law, DISSENT (Fall 
2015), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/title-ix-activism-sexual-violence-law 
[https://perma.cc/DRM2-Q4TY]; see also Nancy Gertner, Sex, Lies and Justice, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 12, 
2015), http://prospect.org/article/sex-lies-and-justice [https://perma.cc/M66S-6GNZ] (“Sexual 
misconduct impairs a woman’s ability to function as an equal in an academic environment—and by 
extension menaces all women.  Unless a woman is safe, all the other guarantees of equal treatment are 
irrelevant.”). 
 22.  Cantalupo, Congratulations and Cautions, supra note 21, at 284. 
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educational settings, to further equal opportunity in education.23  Both administrative 
agencies and courts define sex-based discrimination to include sexual harassment, 
which in turn encompasses sexual assault.24  Therefore, Title IX recognizes a 
complicated right of students to be free from sexual harassment and sexual assault in 
educational settings, and in some circumstances provides a cause of action should 
this right be violated by a university that fails to address and rectify reported sexual 
harassment.25   
Much of the tension in Title IX debates arises from the complicated interplay of 
the rights of students—both accusing and accused—and the corresponding 
obligations of their universities to protect these rights.  Because universities must 
protect often directly adverse rights and interests of students on both sides of a sexual 
assault complaint, they are placed in a delicate balancing position of attempting to 
follow their Title IX obligations to protect the rights of complainants without 
denying due process rights to accused students.  The rights of Title IX complainants 
“don’t exist in a vacuum, but rather in relation to other rights, including those of the 
respondent (the student accused of sexual assault).”26  For this reason, students’ Title 
IX rights have evolved as Title IX has been construed through definitions of what 
constitutes actionable sex-based discrimination and through understandings of the 
due process rights of the accused, as well as obligations of the educational university.   
B. Campus Sexual Assault 
In 2019, the Association of American Universities released a campus climate 
survey on sexual assault and misconduct which revealed that 25.9% of women 
undergraduate students “reported experiencing nonconsensual penetration, 
attempted penetration, sexual touching by force, or inability to consent since they 
have been enrolled in their respective school.”27  Additionally, over 41% of all 
students reported experiencing sexual harassment, and “[18.9%] of students reported 
sexually harassing behavior that either ‘interfered with their academic or 
professional performance,’ ‘limited their ability to participate in an academic 
program’ or ‘created an intimidating, hostile or offensive social, academic or work 
environment.’”28  
                                                                                                     
 23.  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). 
 24.  Cantalupo, Congratulations and Cautions, supra note 21, at 282 (“Included in Title IX’s 
definition of sex discrimination are sexual and other forms of gender-based violence, which are 
commonly considered severe forms of sexual harassment, itself a type of sex discrimination that violates 
Title IX.”).  This Comment specifically focuses on campus sexual assault as defined by the Office for 
Civil Rights as “physical sexual acts perpetrated against a person’s will or where a person is incapable 
of giving consent.”  U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., OFF. C.R., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1 (Apr. 29, 2014). 
 25.  See infra note 60. 
 26.  Mann, supra note 10, at 634. 
 27.  DAVID CANTOR ET AL., ASS’N OF AM. UNIVS., REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE 
SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND MISCONDUCT 14 (2020), https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files 
/AAU-Files/Key-Issues/Campus-Safety/Revised%20Aggregate%20report%20%20and%20appendices 
%201-7_(01-16-2020_FINAL).pdf [https://perma.cc/428W-ZL7Z]. 
 28.  Id. at xiii.  
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Despite protestations that Title IX has been taken too far in the past decade,29 
44.8% of women and 36% of TGQN (transgender, genderqueer, nonconforming) 
college students report that sexual assault and misconduct is “‘very’ or ‘extremely’ 
problematic at their school.”30  Even as of 2014, approximately 41% of schools in a 
national sample had failed to conduct even a single sexual misconduct investigation 
during the preceding five years.31 
Muddying the picture further, campus sexual assaults are often difficult to 
investigate because they frequently occur when one or both parties is under the 
influence of alcohol, or when they are in an existing relationship.32  This 
complication is directly relevant to the debate over the appropriateness of cross-
examination for Title IX grievance procedures, because “[i]t is incredibly difficult 
for anyone ever to know what happened when the only people who were there do not 
remember.”33  
College students who experience sexual assault disproportionately suffer 
academic consequences, including lower GPAs and higher dropout rates.34  Victims 
of sexual assault in college, like victims of sexual assault more broadly, have higher 
rates of subsequent emotional distress and mental health challenges and suffer from 
increased economic burdens stemming from the assault.35  College sexual assault 
                                                                                                     
 29.  See, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr. & KC Johnson, End the Bias in Campus Sexual-Misconduct 
Tribunals, REALCLEAR POL. (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2018/02/05 
/end_the_bias_in_campus_sexual-misconduct_tribunals_136186.html [https://perma.cc/NCS9-M7ZN]; 
Editorial, Campus Kangaroo Courts, WASH. EXAM’R (Sept. 15, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www. 
washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/campus-kangaroo-courts [https://perma.cc/C4JK-NXM3]; 
Emily Yoffe, The Uncomfortable Truth About Campus Rape Policy, ATLANTIC (Sept. 6, 2017), https:// 
www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/09/the-uncomfortable-truth-about-campus-rape-policy 
/538974/ [https://perma.cc/Y37V-2T25]. 
 30.  CANTOR ET AL., supra note 27, at xv. 
 31.  CLAIRE MCCASKILL, SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS, U.S. SENATE, 8 (Jul. 9, 2014), 
http://dcrcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Sen.-McCaskills-Sexual-Violence-on-Campus-Survey-
Report1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BHQ-PFY2] [hereinafter Senate Report]. 
 32.  See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Campus Misconduct, Sexual Harm and Appropriate Process: 
The Essential Sexuality of it All, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 777, 788-89 (2017) [hereinafter Baker, Essential 
Sexuality] (“Approximately seventy-eight percent of all sexual misconduct incidents involve either one 
or both parties drinking,” and “[s]tudies indicate that thirty-three percent of all alleged incidents of 
sexual assault involved victims who were drunk, passed out, or asleep.”); Lori E. Shah, Title IX, Sexual 
Assault, and the Issue of Effective Consent: Blurred Lines—When Should “Yes” Mean “No”?, 91 IND. 
L.J. 1363, 1371 (2016) (“[M]any, if not most, campus sexual assaults take place in the context of a 
‘hookup.’”). 
 33.  Baker, Essential Sexuality, supra note 32, at 796. 
 34.  Cecilia Mengo & Beverly Black, Violence Victimization on a College Campus: Impact on GPA 
and School Dropout, 18 J. C. STUDENT RETENTION: RES., THEORY & PRAC. 234, 244 (2015); Carol E. 
Jordan et al., An Exploration of Sexual Victimization and Academic Performance Among College 
Women, 15 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 191, 196-97 (2014). 
 35.  Cora Peterson et al., Lifetime Economic Burden of Rape Among U.S. Adults, 52 AM. J. 
PREVENTATIVE MED., 2017, at 697-98 (“The present-value, per-victim estimated lifetime cost of rape 
was $122,471,” which represents costs incurred over the victim’s lifetime and does not include 
intangible costs like a monetized version of pain and suffering.); CANTOR ET AL., supra note 27, at 26-
27 (“For incidents involving penetration, [62%] of women, [75.7%] of TGQN students, and [48.2%] of 
men reported at least one academic or professional consequence.  The most common reactions reported 
by those reporting at least one consequence were decreased class attendance (36.3% women, 54.1% 
TGQN students, and 28.0% men), difficulty concentrating on studies, assignments, and exams (55.5% 
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victims are significantly more likely to drop out of school than their peers.36  
Specifically, college victims of sexual assault may suffer from declines in 
educational performance and drops in grades which can lead to loss of scholarships; 
reduced opportunities for admission to future competitive graduate programs; 
delayed degree completion; transfer to other, often less prestigious, schools; 
academic probation; and even expulsion.37  Thus, unless colleges take action to 
ensure that victims receive services and accommodations necessary to recover from 
trauma, they may lose access to education.   
1. Underreporting of Sexual Assault 
Sexual assault is notoriously underreported to law enforcement.  According to 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics published in 2019, 33.9% of victims of rape/sexual 
assault report to law enforcement, down from what may have been a #MeToo spike 
in 2017 of 40.4%.38  Female college students have a lower reporting rate of 20% than 
nonstudent females age 18-24.39  The reasons for underreporting of sexual assault 
are numerous, and for college students often relate to feelings that the student can 
handle the situation herself, was too ashamed or embarrassed, felt reporting would 
be too emotionally difficult, or perceived that the incident was not sufficiently 
serious to warrant reporting.40  When students felt that their assaults were 
insufficiently serious to report, they most frequently based this on the fact that they 
were not physically injured,41 even though “virtually all victims of penetration and 
most victims of sexual touching reported behavioral, emotional, academic, or 
                                                                                                     
women, 68.7% TGQN students, and 38.2% men), and difficulty going to work (23.2% women, 39.0% 
TGQN students, and 17.7% men) . . . The prevalence of academic and professional consequences for 
sexual touching was significantly lower, although a significant number were affected in some way 
(32.8% women, 57.2% TGQN students, and 27.5% men).”). 
 36.  Corey Bowman, How Colleges Can Prevent Students from Dropping Out After a Sexual 
Assault Incident HUFFPOST (Jul. 23, 2016), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/sexual-assault-hurting-
retention-and-recruitment_b_5792383be4b0a1917a6e7cbb [https://perma.cc/7HNQ-5P8R]. 
 37.  Dana Bolger, Gender Violence Costs: Schools’ Financial Obligations Under Title IX, 125 
YALE L. J. 2106, 2116-18 (2016); see also Cari Simon, On Top of Everything Else, Sexual Assault Hurts 
the Survivors’ Grades, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything 
/wp/2014/08/06/after-a-sexual-assault-survivors-gpas-plummet-this-is-a-bigger-problem-than-you-think/ 
[https://perma.cc/BB3A-JVJY]. 
 38.  RACHEL E. MORGAN & JENNIFER TRUMAN, BUREAU JUST. STAT., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 
2019, at 8 (2020), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv19.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ADJ-TTWQ]; 
Susan Milligan, Sexual Assault Reports Spike in #MeToo Era, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 17, 
2018, 3:32 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2018-12-27/sexual-assault-
reports-spike-in-metoo-era [https://perma.cc/K65T-P6LF]. 
 39.  RAINN, Campus Sexual Violence, supra note 1 (stating that 20% of female student victims 
report to law enforcement, compared with thirty-two percent of nonstudent females in the same age 
range). 
 40.  CTR. PUB. INTEGRITY, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUS: A FRUSTRATING SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 
30 (Gordon Witkin & David Donald eds., 2010), https://cloudfront-files-1.publicintegrity.org 
/documents/pdfs/Sexual%20Assault%20on%20Campus.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5MX-K6B6]. 
 41.   CANTOR ET AL., supra note 27, at 31 (“The most common reason given for why an incident 
was ‘not serious enough’ or ‘other’ for sexual penetration was that the student was not injured (69.8% 
women, 59.4% TGQN students, and 67.9% men).”). 
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professional consequences of the incident.”42  Women were also less likely to report 
when alcohol was involved, when the event began consensually, or when they felt 
that “events like this seem common.”43  This fits with other research confirming “that 
victims are more likely to report to law enforcement if the characteristics of the rape 
make it likely to seem more believable to others.”44  Because only 1.6% of rape 
complaints end in trial,45 this is a logical, if depressing, calculus made by victims—
why go through the process of reporting and investigation if the odds that your efforts 
will result in a trial, let alone a conviction, are so small?46   
In sum, approximately 80% of rape and sexual assault victimizations of students 
are not reported to the police,47 making campus investigations and adjudications 
critical, as often these are the only investigations and adjudications that will occur.48  
And yet, these too are rare.  Prior to the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter,49 students rarely 
reported assaults to their universities, and subsequent investigations and 
adjudications were even rarer.50  Despite widespread criticism that the 2011 Dear 
Colleague Letter pushed colleges to go too far in investigating and adjudicating 
campus assaults,51 a 2014 Senate Report found that:   
                                                                                                     
 42.  Id. at 30-31. (“Across the genders, the most common responses for penetration was that they 
could handle it themselves (48.8% women, 60.4% men, 40.1% TGQN students), the incident was not 
serious enough to contact a program or resource (47.4% women, 42.5% men, 42.0% TGQN students), 
and because the person felt embarrassed, ashamed, or that it would be too emotionally difficult to report 
(41.7% women, 27.9% men, 36.0% TGQN students).  Other prevalent reasons given were, the victim 
did not think the resources could help them (21.9% women, 19.6% men, 36.3% TGQN students) and the 
victim did not want to get the perpetrator in trouble (24.5% women, 22.7% men, 26.0% TGQN 
students).”). 
 43.  Id. (“The other most common reasons reported related to the circumstances of the incident.  For 
example, [54%] of women who reported penetration did not contact a program or resource because 
alcohol was involved, [49.9%] because the event began consensually, and [45.1%] because ‘events like 
this seem common.’”). 
 44.  MELISSA S. MORABITO ET AL., DECISION MAKING IN SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES: REPLICATION 
RESEARCH ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE CASE ATTRITION IN THE U.S. 108 (2019), https://www.ncjrs.gov 
/pdffiles1/nij/grants/252689.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ6S-6BF7].  
 45.  Id. 
 46.  RAINN, Campus Sexual Violence, supra note 1 (“Out of every 1000 sexual assaults, 995 
perpetrators will walk free.”). 
 47.  SOFI SINOZICH & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 
VICTIMIZATION AMONG COLLEGE-AGE FEMALES, 1995-2013, at 1 (2014). 
 48.  CTR. PUB. INTEGRITY, supra note 40, at 19 (“Most cases involving campus rape allegations 
come down to he-said-she-said accounts of sexual acts that clearly occurred; they lack independent 
corroboration like physical evidence or eyewitness testimony.  At times, alcohol and drugs play such a 
central role, students can’t remember details.  Given all this, says Gary Pavela, who ran judicial 
programs at the University of Maryland, College Park, ‘[a] prosecutor says, ‘I’m not going to take this 
to a jury.’  Often, the only venues in which to resolve these cases are on campus.”).  
 49.  See infra Part II(A)(1). 
 50.  CTR. PUB. INTEGRITY, supra note 40, at 32-33. 
 51.  See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET ET AL., FAIRNESS FOR ALL STUDENTS UNDER TITLE IX, 
(Aug. 21, 2017),  https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33789434/Fairness%20for%20All 
%20Students.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/8693-MZG9]; KC JOHNSON, HERITAGE 
FOUND., HOW AMERICAN COLLEGE CAMPUSES HAVE BECOME ANTI-DUE PROCESS (Aug. 2, 2016), 
http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/BG3113.pdf; FIRE Response to OCR ‘Dear Colleague’ 
Letter on Universities’ Obligations Regarding Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault, FIRE (Apr. 4, 
2011), https://www.thefire.org/fire-response-to-ocr-dear-colleague-letter-on-universities-obligations-
regarding-sexual-harassment-and-sexual-assault/ [https://perma.cc/ZR99-37P5]. 
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Despite the prevalence of campus sexual assaults, about 41% of schools in the 
national sample reported not having conducted a single investigation in the past five 
years.  More than 81% of private for-profit schools and 77% of institutions with 
fewer than 1000 students have not conducted any investigations.  Interestingly, 
approximately 6% of the nation’s largest public institutions also have not conducted 
any investigations in the last five years.52 
Additionally, the Senate Report “found that 21% of the nation’s largest private 
institutions conducted fewer investigations than the number of incidents reported to 
the Department of Education, with some institutions reporting as many as seven 
times more incidents of sexual violence than they have investigated.”53  Feminist 
legal scholars argue that the tepid response of universities to sexual assault, and the 
reason that Title IX campus adjudicatory processes are so contested, can be explained 
by the lack of societal agreement on the harms, if any, suffered by victims of sexual 
assault.  As Katharine Baker notes:   
schools should be mindful that much of the criticism of the reform attempts, while 
sounding in process, have more to do with skepticism about the existence of the 
injury.  If we believe that at least some women are substantially injured when sex is 
taken from them without their consent, we must be prepared to accept the subjective, 
psychological, and random nature of the injury. . . . Once we accept that women are 
harmed and that they are harmed by college students because those students 
transgress reasonable norms of appropriate and respectful conduct, calls for 
criminal-process protections should dissipate.  In nonsexual contexts, no 
controversy is attached to schools that discipline students without affording them 
traditional criminal process.54  
It is crucial to highlight the harms faced by victims of campus sexual assault, 
and the failures of colleges to encourage reporting and adequately investigate and 
adjudicate these cases.  Unless the legitimacy and extent of campus sexual assault is 
recognized, there will only be a weak foundation for arguing that the alleged 
perpetrators of this “harm” should be punished—and an inversely compelling 
argument that the due process rights of these alleged perpetrators must be protected.  
If we cannot be sure that what the alleged perpetrator did is wrong, even if he did 
commit the alleged act, then we will inevitably be queasy about adjudicatory and 
disciplinary processes.55   
And yet, by refusing to recognize the harms of campus sexual assault, and 
thereby overly weighting due process concerns of the accused, policymakers and 
universities ensure these harms will continue.  Much of the concern regarding the 
new Title IX regulations is that they will have a chilling effect on Title IX reporting 
on campuses,56 pushing the investigation and adjudication process back into the 
                                                                                                     
 52.  Senate Report, supra note 31, at 8. 
 53.  Id. at 9. 
 54.  Baker, Essential Sexuality, supra note 32, at 803. 
 55.  See Alexandra Brodsky, A Rising Tide: Learning About Fair Disciplinary Process from Title 
IX, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 822, 829 (2017) (“[T]he long-term realization of accused and victimized 
students’ interests depends on the perceived legitimacy of disciplinary procedures for gender 
violence.”). 
 56.  See, e.g., Reasons to Oppose Proposed Changes to Title IX, Part Four: They Discourage 
Students from Reporting, BOS. AREA RAPE CRISIS CTR. (Jan. 23, 2019), https://barcc.org/blog/details 
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“culture of secrecy”57 it so recently inhabited prior to the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter.  
This will exacerbate the direct and indirect harms caused by campus sexual assault 
and, more broadly, perpetuate dangerous campus cultures that create a breeding 
ground for sexual assault.58  Further, and as described in detail in Part II, improperly 
handled Title IX campus investigations and grievance procedures can further harm 
victims of sexual assault. 
II. TITLE IX, DUE PROCESS, AND CROSS-EXAMINATION 
A. The Office for Civil Rights and Title IX Enforcement: University Obligations 
Title IX applies broadly to all colleges and universities receiving federal 
funding, so its obligations to protect students from sex-based discrimination apply to 
nearly all higher education institutions.59  These obligations are delineated by the 
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) within the Department of Education, the agency with 
                                                                                                     
/reasons-to-oppose-proposed-changes-to-title-ix-part-four-they-discourage-st [https://perma.cc/ME5W-
2YQW]; Anna North, Betsy DeVos’s New Sexual Harassment Rules Might Already be Hurting Students, 
VOX (Jan. 31, 2019, 11:40AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/1/31/18202447/sexual-assault-title-ix-
betsy-devos-drew [https://perma.cc/4E3H-AANW]; Gabrielle Schwartz, POV: Proposed Title IX Rules 
Will Discourage Victims From Coming Forward, BU TODAY (Dec. 12, 2018), http://www.bu.edu 
/articles/2018/pov-proposed-title-ix-rules-will-discourage-victims-from-coming-forward/ 
[https://perma.cc/2AZW-XDGN]. 
 57.  CTR. PUB. INTEGRITY, supra note 40, at 7-8. 
 58.  See, e.g., Alexandra H. Solomon, Talking to College Students About “The Red Zone,” PSYCH. 
TODAY (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/loving-bravely/201808/talking-
college-students-about-the-red-zone [https://perma.cc/3D2Y-2TJY]; Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, Avoiding the 
Red Zone, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/09/12 
/experts-say-new-methods-needed-combat-red-zone-campuses [https://perma.cc/3PLQ-QW4H] 
(discussing the campus “red zone,” the period between the start of school in August and Thanksgiving 
break, when freshman students, particularly females, are most likely to be sexually assaulted, an issue 
that remains a problem even after the increased Obama-era attention to Title IX compliance); Hillary 
Hunter, Strike Three: Calling Out College Officials for Sexual Assault on Campus, 50 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 277, 280 (2018) (“Athletic participation fosters the type of masculine aggression trademark of the 
sexually-aggressive culture.  In fact, ‘[a] startling 54 percent of . . . student-athletes admitted to 
committing at least one ‘sexually coercive’ act in their lifetime[].’” (quoting Ed Cara, Half of Male 
College Athletes Admit History of ‘Sexually Coercive’ Behavior Such as Sexual Assault, Rape, MED. 
DAILY (June 2, 2016, 8:59 PM), http://www.medicaldaily.com/college-athletes-sexual-assault-rape-
myths-388585 [https://perma.cc/GK4C-APQJ])). 
 59.  See Baumgardner, supra note 15 and accompanying text.  Title IX is a floor rather than a 
ceiling, and sexual assaults can be dealt with on campus without implicating Title IX because, 
fundamentally, Title IX requires educational institutions not to discriminate on the basis of sex, which in 
the context of sexual harassment means failing to respond to known sexual harassment  thereby 
interfering with the respondent’s ability to equally access education.  See, e.g., Corey Rayburn Yung, Is 
Relying on Title IX a Mistake?, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 891, 903 (2016) (“Title IX’s role in university 
sexual assault cases is uncertain and actively evolving.  Importantly, it is possible that Title IX need not 
be applied at all to university sexual assault by and against students.  Its role in regard to student-to-
student sexual assault cases is a very recent development.  For decades, universities addressed sexual 
assault accusations and punished those found responsible without any acknowledgement of Title IX.  
The long-standing mechanism used to address sexual assault allegations between students has been and 
remains student codes of conduct.  The use of student codes has left much to be desired and questions 
remain about their continued utility as well.”). 
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statutory jurisdiction over the Act.60  Broadly, Title IX imposes four requirements on 
universities: (1) publication of notices of nondiscrimination, (2) appointment and 
training of Title IX Coordinators, (3) adoption and publication of grievance 
procedures to resolve complaints based on sex-discrimination, and (4) prompt 
responses to reports of violations.61  This Comment is concerned specifically with 
the grievance procedures required by Title IX, because it is at this point in the 
adjudication process that the due process debate over cross-examination arises.  
Within the specific context of potential Title IX liability for student-on-student 
sexual assault, a university that fails to comply with Title IX may be subject to either 
administrative sanctions imposed by OCR,62 or to a lawsuit brought by the 
complaining student seeking either injunctive relief or monetary damages.63 
Because Title IX is administered and enforced by the OCR, the agency “has 
accordingly promulgated official regulations that interpret and expound upon the 
statute itself.”64  In 1997, OCR formally established Title IX compliance standards, 
including a requirement that universities address student-on-student sexual 
harassment.65  In 2001, OCR issued further guidance to clarify that physical sexual 
assault qualified as sexual harassment, emphasizing that 
[t]he more severe the conduct, the less the need to show a repetitive series of 
incidents; this is particularly true if the harassment is physical.  For instance, if the 
conduct is more severe, e.g., attempts to grab a female student’s breasts or attempts 
to grab any student’s genital area or buttocks, it need not be as persistent to create a 
hostile environment.  Indeed, a single or isolated incident of sexual harassment may, 
                                                                                                     
 60.  “[T]he OCR’s jurisdiction is established by Section 106.31(b) of the Title IX regulations . . . .”  
Sweeney, supra note 7, at 69. 
 61.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. C.R., Q&A ON CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, at 3 (Sept. 2017) 
[hereinafter 2017 Q&A]. 
 62.  Because federal education funding is conditioned on compliance with Title IX, if a school is 
found to have violated Title IX, the ultimate sanction is termination or suspension of federal funds, 
rather than a legal judgment requiring payment of damages to a particular student.  34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h), 
(i) (2010); see also JARED P. COLE & CHRISTINE J. BACK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45685, TITLE IX AND 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION, ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT, AND PROPOSED 
REGULATIONS 1, 19-21 (2019).  During the Obama era there was a marked attempt at enforcing Title 
IX, and from April 2011 to March 2018, OCR conducted 502 investigations of colleges for potentially 
violating Title IX through mishandling reported cases of sexual harassment; a number which includes 
lawsuits brought by accused students.  Title IX, Tracking Sexual Assault Investigations, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., http://projects.chronicle.com/titleix/ [https://perma.cc/HF8G-USBX] (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). 
 63.  An institution may be liable for monetary damages under a judicially recognized private cause 
of action under Title IX if the plaintiff can meet the high burden of showing that the institution:  (1) had 
actual knowledge of the peer-on-peer sexual harassment, (2) “exercise[d] substantial control over both 
the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs,” (3) that the harassment was 
“severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive,” and (4) that the harassment “so undermines and detracts 
from the victims’ educational experience, that the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to 
an institution’s resources and opportunities.”  Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645, 
650, 651 (1999). 
 64.  Triplett, supra note 12, at 495-96.  This guidance is accorded Chevron deference by courts.  
See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993) (“The degree of deference is 
particularly high in Title IX cases because Congress explicitly delegated to the agency the task of 
prescribing standards . . . .”). 
 65.  U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE 1997 (1997), https://www2.ed.gov 
/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexhar01.html [https://perma.cc/8QKV-7ZFL]. 
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if sufficiently severe, create a hostile environment.66 
The recognition that sexual harassment, including physical sexual assault, was 
actionable under Title IX was not accompanied by meaningful enforcement efforts.67  
According to data received in response to Freedom of Information Act requests, 
approximately twenty-four Title IX investigations at college campuses were resolved 
from 1998 to 2008, and of the five schools found to have violated Title IX in these 
investigations, none were punished.68 
1. 2011 Dear Colleague Letter & 2014 Q&A: A Victim-Centered Approach 
In 2011, the Obama-era OCR published a twenty-page Dear Colleague Letter 
(hereinafter 2011 Dear Colleague Letter)69 providing, for the first time, guidance to 
colleges and universities on schools’ obligations with respect to peer sexual 
harassment investigation and adjudication.70  Prior to the 2011 Dear Colleague 
Letter, there was no universal standard requiring colleges and universities to 
maintain grievance procedures to resolve student complaints of sexual harassment.71  
For this reason, “[b]y 2010 many colleges lacked clear grievance procedures to 
resolve students’ complaints,” resulting in haphazard and inconsistent sexual 
harassment investigation and adjudication procedures.72  Responding to a concern 
about the prevalence of sexual violence on college campuses, the OCR published the 
                                                                                                     
 66.  U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS 
BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES: TITLE IX 6 (Jan. 2001), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.html [https://perma.cc/73R3-Z3JN]; see also 
Gersen & Gersen, supra note 19. (“According to this legal logic, if a college did not have effective 
policies and procedures in place to address harassing conduct that is pervasive or severe enough to 
create a hostile environment, the college would be discriminating on the basis of sex and in violation of 
Title IX.”). 
 67.  See R. Shep Melnick, The Strange Evolution of Title IX, NAT’L AFFS. (Summer 2018), 
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-strange-evolution-of-title-ix 
[https://perma.cc/A8M3-39B5]. 
 68.  CTR. PUB. INTEGRITY, supra note 40, at 74. 
 69.  Administrative agencies, including the Department of Education, frequently issue such letters 
to clarify existing regulations and guidance.  However, these letters are subject to challenge if they go 
beyond providing guidance and effect new rules, as these interpretations are not considered binding 
unless they follow the Administrative Procedure’s Act requirements for promulgating new rules, 
including a required notice-and-comment period.  See, e.g., Blake Emerson, The Claims of Official 
Reason: Administrative Guidance on Social Inclusion, 128 YALE L. J. 2122, 2126-27 (2019) (“The 
distinction between regulations and guidance is grounded in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 
(APA), which lays out procedural requirements for agency rulemaking, including provision of notice 
and opportunity for public comment.  The APA exempts from these requirements interpretive rules and 
‘general statements of policy.’  The courts have interpreted this ‘guidance exemption’ to apply to agency 
documents that lack legal force either because the agency does not ‘intend[] to bind itself’ by those 
documents or because they do not have ‘binding effect.’  Whether guidance issued without notice and 
comment is procedurally valid therefore depends in the first instance on whether it has such binding 
qualities.  If it does, then the guidance may be an invalid legislative rule, issued outside the procedures 
required by the APA.  Disputes over guidance documents thus often turn on whether their terms are 
binding or whether they are applied in a binding way to the regulated public.”).  
 70.  Robin Wilson, One Letter Changed Colleges’ Response to Rape Cases, CHRON. OF HIGHER 
EDUC., Feb. 17, 2017, at A22.  
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
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2011 Dear Colleague Letter to establish a clear universal standard for colleges and 
universities to use in adjudicating peer sexual harassment complaints, and this 
standard was unequivocally victim-centered.73  
The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter addressed concerns regarding the potential of 
harm to accusers through cross-examination and emphasized that “OCR strongly 
discourages schools from allowing the parties personally to question or cross-
examine each other during the hearing.  Allowing an alleged perpetrator to question 
an alleged victim directly may be traumatic or intimidating, thereby possibly 
escalating or perpetuating a hostile environment.”74 
The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter generated substantial controversy, with 
victims’ advocates applauding the guidance as a fair and necessary step forward, and 
criminal defense attorneys and due process advocates arguing that the guidance 
violated the due process rights of the accused.75   
In 2014, the Department of Education issued Questions and Answers on Title 
IX and Sexual Violence (2014 Q&A) to serve as a sister document to the 2011 DCL, 
which provided further technical guidance to schools regarding their obligations 
under Title IX, specifically with respect to complaints of sexual violence.76  In this 
guidance, the OCR reiterated that schools must implement and adhere to grievance 
procedures which utilize a preponderance of the evidence standard (“i.e., more likely 
than not that sexual violence occurred.”).77  The Q&A notes that “[t]he investigation 
may include a hearing to determine whether the conduct occurred, but Title IX does 
not necessarily require a hearing.”78  As in the 2011 DCL, the OCR reinforced within 
the 2014 Q&A that cross-examination should not be conducted by the parties 
because “[a]llowing an alleged perpetrator to question a complainant directly may 
be traumatic or intimidating, and may perpetuate a hostile environment.”79  Although 
the Q&A did not require that schools follow a particular method for handling cross-
examination in the alternative, it provided as a suggestion that “[a] school may 
choose, instead, to allow the parties to submit questions to a trained third party (e.g., 
the hearing panel) to ask the questions on their behalf,” and to have those questions 
screened so that only “appropriate and relevant” questions are posed.80 
The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter and 2014 Q&A prompted action at colleges and 
universities across the country, with approximately 120 revising their policies.81  
                                                                                                     
 73.  2011 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 9-12. 
 74.  Id. at 11. 
 75.  Jed Rubenfeld, Privatization and State Action: Do Campus Sexual Assault Hearings Violate 
Due Process?, 96 TEX. L. REV. 15, 67 (2017) (“[M]any of the post-2011 Title IX sexual assault trials 
that took place, and still are taking place, all over the country were and are unconstitutional.”); see also 
Kelly Rice, Understanding the Implications of the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter: Why Colleges Should 
Not Adjudicate On-Campus Sexual Assault Claims, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 763, 766 (2018) (“Women who 
are sexually assaulted deserve justice and men who are accused of sexual assault deserve to have their 
due process rights protected.  It seems that the DCL is unable to accomplish both.”). 
 76.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. C. R., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE, at ii (Apr. 29, 2014). 
 77.  Id. at 13. 
 78.  Id. at 25. 
 79.  Id. at 31.  
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Venetis, supra note 16, at 147 (estimating this number from public comments made by 
university officials on the DeVos proposed regulations). 
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Because the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter and 2014 Q&A were not notice-and-
comment regulations, and therefore did not carry the weight of law, critics argued 
they violated administrative law requirements and were both procedurally and 
substantively invalid.82 
2. Reaction to the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter and 2014 Q&A: Enforcement and 
Backlash 
Universities have been held accountable in high profile court actions and by 
OCR for failing to uphold their Title IX obligations for victims of sexual assault at 
universities.83  But the recent trend in Title IX litigation against universities involves 
cases brought by students accused of sexual assault arguing that their institutions 
failed to adequately protect them under Title IX, usually through failing to provide 
adequate procedural protections.84  These complainants, almost entirely male, allege 
that their institutions’ Title IX investigations and grievance procedures discriminate 
against them on the basis of sex by being improperly weighted toward protecting the 
interests of female victims.85  As of 2015, 32% of Title IX lawsuits filed against 
universities were brought by alleged perpetrators.86 
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Madison Pauly, This Explosive Lawsuit Could Change How Colleges Deal with Athletes Accused of 
Sexual Assault, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/03/sexual-
assault-case-against-university-tennessee-explained/ [https://perma.cc/Q8U4-6PCF]; Marc Tracy, 
Florida State Settles Suit over Jameis Winston Rape Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2016), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/sports/football/florida-state-to-pay-jameis-winstons-accuser-950000-in-
settlement.html [https://perma.cc/FU8Z-TQAY]. 
 84.  Olivia Messer, How Hundreds of Campus #MeToo Punishments Could Get Tossed, DAILY 
BEAST (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.thedailybeast.com/campus-men-were-punished-over-metoo-
allegations-now-theyre-suing [https://perma.cc/YZ39-KBE3]. 
 85.  James Moore & Kursat Christoff Pekgoz, The Unfairer Sex, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 18, 
2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2019/12/18/men-are-banding-together-class-action-
lawsuits-against-discrimination-title-ix [https://perma.cc/H4PT-KXQB].  Courts in every circuit have 
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supra note 16, at 135 (“To establish an ‘erroneous outcome’ claim, a student must allege that he or she 
is innocent, and that ‘but for’ a discriminatory process, the student would not have been disciplined.  A 
‘selective enforcement’ claim must establish that, regardless of the student’s wrongdoing, the decision 
to originate the proceeding and/or the severity of the punishment was influenced by the student’s 
gender.”). 
 86.  Confronting Campus Sexual Assault, supra note 18, at 17-18 (“Nearly one-third [32%] of the 
litigation against institutions was initiated by students accused of sexual assault.  Sanctions often drove 
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In February 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 1377, establishing a 
federal policy “to lower regulatory burdens on the American people by implementing 
and enforcing regulatory reform,”87 in part through tasking all agencies with 
reviewing existing regulations and making recommendations “regarding their repeal, 
replacement, or modification.”88  This Executive Order included a call for public 
comments, and, in response, 12,035 of the 16,376 comments received specifically 
addressed Title IX.89   
As part of a broader reversal of Obama-era Department of Education 
Guidelines,90 Trump Administration Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos withdrew 
the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter in September 2017, supplanting it with new Q&A 
guidance on campus sexual misconduct, stating this was required because the prior 
guidance “created a system that lacked basic elements of due process and failed to 
ensure fundamental fairness.”91  Additionally, the Department of Education 
announced its intention to engage in Title IX notice-and-comment rulemaking to 
promulgate new regulations that would carry the force of law.92   
Prior to determining that the Obama-era guidance was procedurally unfair, 
Secretary DeVos met with multiple men’s rights organizations.93  Additionally, 
                                                                                                     
the litigation.  More than half of the perpetrators who brought litigation had been expelled from the 
institution.  However, a little more than a third of the perpetrators were given light sanctions or no 
sanctions at all.”). 
 87.  Exec. Ord. No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285, 12,285 (Feb. 24, 2017).  
 88.  Id. at 12,286. 
 89.  Tiffany Buffkin et al., Widely Welcomed and Supported by the Public: A Report on the Title IX-
Related Comments in the U.S. Department of Education's Executive Order 13777 Comment Call, 9 
CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 71, 75 (2019). 
 90.  See, e.g., Anya Kamenetz, DeVos to Rescind Obama-Era Guidance on School Discipline, NPR 
(Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/18/675556455/devos-to-rescind-obama-era-guidance-on-
school-discipline [https://perma.cc/YM7Y-JK36] (school discipline); Erica L. Green, DeVos Repeals 
Obama-Era Rule Cracking Down on For-Profit Colleges, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/28/us/politics/betsy-devos-for-profit-colleges.html 
[https://perma.cc/CZ2P-HK4A] (regulation of for-profit colleges); Ella Nilsen & Carly Sitrin, How 
Betsy DeVos is Quietly Erasing Obama’s Education Legacy, Vox (Oct. 2, 2017, 8:30 AM), https:// 
www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/2/16229474/devos-erasing-obamas-education-legacy 
[https://perma.cc/73ZF-NZVU] (overview); Tal Axelrod, Federal Judge Rules DeVos Illegally Delayed 
Obama-Era Special Education Rule, THE HILL (Mar. 8, 2019, 8:04 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews 
/administration/433312-federal-judge-rules-devos-illegally-delayed-obama-era-special 
[https://perma.cc/4MW2-YCB4] (racial disparities in special education); Jeremy W. Peters et al., Trump 
Rescinds Rules on Bathrooms for Transgender Students, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/02/22/us/politics/devos-sessions-transgender-students-rights.html 
[https://perma.cc/338U-JV53] (transgender student rights). 
 91.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Department of Education Issues New Interim Guidance on 
Campus Sexual Misconduct (Sept. 22, 2017), http://ed.gov/news/press-releases/department-education-
issues-new-interim-guidance-campus-sexual-misconduct [https://perma.cc/YN85-8DC9] [hereinafter 
Press Release Sept. 22, 2017].  Despite Secretary DeVos’s claims that the Department of Education’s 
revocation of prior Title IX guidance and proposal of new regulations was a response to wide criticisms 
of the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, an analysis of these comments shows that “the system of Title IX 
enforcement implemented by the Obama administration was in fact widely welcomed and supported by 
the public.”  Buffkin et al., supra note 89, at 72 (emphasis omitted). 
 92.  Press Release Sept. 22, 2017, supra note 91.  
 93.  Erin Dooley et al., Betsy DeVos’ Meetings with ‘Men’s Rights’ Groups Over Campus Sex 
Assault Policies Spark Controversy, ABC NEWS (Jul. 14, 2017, 4:29 AM), https://abcnews.go.com 
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Candice Jackson, the top civil rights official at DeVos’s Department of Education, 
opined that campus sexual misconduct investigations pursuant to the 2011 DCL were 
not “fairly balanced between the accusing victim and the accused student,” resulting 
in (mostly male) students being labeled as rapists “when the facts just don’t back that 
up.”94  Ms. Jackson further noted that “the accusations—90 percent of them—fall 
into the category of ‘we were both drunk,’ ‘we broke up, and six months later I found 
myself under a Title IX investigation because she just decided that our last sleeping 
together was not quite right.’”95  DeVos’s actions and Jackson’s statements prompted 
concerns from civil rights and women’s groups that the Department of Education 
was basing its revised Title IX guidance on outdated and disproven rape myths that 
women frequently falsely report sexual assault.96 
3. A New Era: Trump Administration Title IX Regulations 
The Department published its proposed regulations on November 29, 2018 and 
accepted public comments through January 30, 2019,97 receiving a total of 124,196 
comments.98  This response vastly exceeded the number of comments typically 
received in response to regulatory proposals from the Department of Education.99  
Notably, the bulk of the comments received were in opposition to the proposed 
                                                                                                     
/Politics/betsy-devos-meetings-mens-rights-groups-sex-assault/story?id=48611688 [https://perma.cc/ 
MG5E-GKCH]. 
 94.  Erica L. Green & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Campus Rape Policies Get a New Look as the Accused 
Get DeVos’s Ear, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/us/politics/campus-
rape-betsy-devos-title-iv-education-trump-candice-jackson.html [https://perma.cc/539Y-SRHC]. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Venetis, supra note 16, at 146-47 (“In August of 2018, a copy of the proposed draft rules that 
would overhaul the way schools should treat sexual assault claims was leaked to The New York Times. . 
. . Secretary DeVos also cited the high-profile UVA and Duke cases as justification for the need for 
sweeping changes in campus sexual assault disciplinary procedures, stating that:  . . . ‘equally high-
profile revelations of rape allegations later shown to be false (for instance, concerning the Duke 
University lacrosse team and the fraternity at the University of Virginia) provide additional evidence 
that the approach created under the Department’s sub regulatory guidance has failed to protect victims 
and innocent accused persons alike.’”). 
 97.  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal 
Financial Assistance, 84 Fed. Reg. 4018 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (codified at 34 C.F.R. 106).  The 
original deadline for submitting comments was January 28, 2019 but was extended to January 30, 2019 
due to issues with the website.  Laura Meckler, Education Department Allows Extra Day for Comments 
on Title IX Rules, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2019, 9:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local 
/education/education-department-allows-extra-day-for-comments-on-title-ix-rules/2019/02/12 
/f7817734-2f16-11e9-813a-0ab2f17e305b_story.html [https://perma.cc/8NX4-3CHF]. 
 98.  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal 
Assistance, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2018-OCR-0064-0001 
[https://perma.cc/M3PD-9STX] (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). 
 99.  Laura Meckler & Susan Svrluga, Comments Pour in Amid Proposed Changes to Title IX Sex 
Assault Reporting, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://bangordailynews.com/2019/01/31/national-politics/comments-pour-in-amid-proposed-changes-
to-title-ix-sex-assault-reporting/ [https://perma.cc/4Z99-DDP3] (“‘This is the most controversial 
regulatory undertaking in the history of the Department of Education,’ said Terry Hartle of the 
American Council on Education, which represents university presidents.  He estimated the volume of 
submissions would total 20 times what is typically received for a major regulatory proposal.”). 
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regulations.100  Despite this strong opposition, in May 2020 the regulations were 
promulgated and became effective August 14, 2020.101   
The new regulations represent a drastic departure from the Obama-era guidance 
and aim to enhance procedural due process, heighten the standards that trigger 
institutions’ obligations to respond to sexual harassment, and narrow the potential 
liability of institutions for those responses.102  In addition to dramatically narrowing 
the pool of potential cases that can be brought under Title IX, the new regulations 
address cross-examination in Title IX cases with an eye toward enhancing the due 
process rights of the accused.103  Of the myriad Title IX changes included in the new 
regulations, two are particularly relevant for the purposes of this comment.   
First, drawing from Supreme Court case law specifically addressing institutional 
liability for a private right of action under Title IX, the new regulations do not require 
institutions to respond to sexual harassment unless they have “actual knowledge” of 
its occurrence.104  Even then, institutions will only incur liability if their response is 
deliberately indifferent.105  This is in contrast to the Obama-era guidance, which 
required a school to take action based on either actual or constructive knowledge of 
“student-on-student harassment that creates a hostile environment.”106  Further, 
under the Obama-era guidance a student could report sexual harassment to any 
school employee “likely to witness or receive reports of sexual harassment and 
violence.”107  However, an institution has no obligation to act under the new 
regulations unless a formal complaint is filed with the Title IX coordinator or another 
person who “has authority to institute corrective measures on behalf of the 
recipient,”108 effectively taking from many students the option to report to a trusted 
                                                                                                     
 100.  Erik Ortiz, Public Comments Reopen for DeVos’ Campus Sexual Assault Rules—But Only for 
One Day, NBC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2019, 9:11 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/public-
comments-reopen-devos-campus-sexual-assault-rules-only-one-n970956 [https://perma.cc/9LVL-GFJU] 
(“The majority of comments received appear to oppose the Education Department’s reworking of the 
federal guidelines known as Title IX.”). 
 101.  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal 
Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30,026, 30,026 (May 19, 2020) [hereinafter 2018 Proposed Title IX 
Regulations] (codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106). 
 102.  See 34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (2020). 
 103.  2018 Proposed Title IX Regulations, supra note 101, at 61,472.  These due process 
enhancements include requiring schools to apply “a presumption of innocence throughout the grievance 
process; written notice of allegations and an equal opportunity to review all evidence collected; and the 
right to cross-examination,” to be conducted not by the parties themselves but by their advisors.  Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Secretary DeVos: Proposed Title IX Rule Provides Clarity for Schools, 
Support for Survivors, and Due Process Rights for All (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-
releases/secretary-devos-proposed-title-ix-rule-provides-clarity-schools-support-survivors-and-due-
process-rights-all [https://perma.cc/JPB6-F3DH] [hereinafter Press Release Nov. 16, 2018]. 
 104.  34 C.F.R. § 106.44(a) (2020) (“A recipient with actual knowledge of sexual harassment in an 
education program or activity of the recipient against a person in the United States must respond in a 
manner that is not deliberately indifferent.  A recipient is deliberately indifferent only if its response to 
sexual harassment is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  2011 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 4. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  34 C.F.R. § 106.30(a) (2020). 
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teacher or coach.109  This change, although beyond the scope of this Comment, 
substantially limits schools’ responsibilities under Title IX to respond to sexual 
harassment and assault on campus.   
Most importantly for the purposes of this Comment, the new regulations require 
that post-secondary institutions provide live hearings, with direct cross-examination 
of adversarial witnesses, as part of the Title IX grievance procedures.110  Under this 
adversarial model, “the decision-maker(s) must permit each party’s advisor to ask 
the other party and any witnesses all relevant questions and follow-up questions, 
including those challenging credibility.”111  This cross-examination may be 
conducted “by the party’s advisor of choice,” and cannot be conducted by the party 
themself. 112  A party who does not have an advisor present at the live hearing must 
be provided with an advisor of their choice by the institution.113  Parties may choose 
to have an attorney serve in the role of advisor.114  Even though the new regulations 
allow institutions to “establish restrictions regarding the extent to which the advisor 
may participate in the proceedings, as long as the restrictions apply equally to both 
parties,” a university must allow that advisor to be present at all grievance 
proceedings and cannot “limit the choice . . . of advisor” for either party.115  As the 
Chancellor of the State University of New York noted, this “would allow the 
fraternity brother or sorority sister, parent, roommate, or anyone else to conduct 
cross-examination.”116   
The new regulations import the Federal Rules of Evidence’s rape shield rule,117 
prohibiting “evidence about the complainant’s sexual predisposition or prior sexual 
behavior” in cross-examination and include the same exceptions proscribed for 
criminal cases.118  These exceptions allow the accused student to introduce otherwise 
prohibited evidence of the complainant’s sexual behavior or predisposition if he does 
so either to “prove that someone other than the respondent committed the conduct 
alleged,” or if the evidence is specific to past sexual behavior between the 
complainant and respondent “and [is] offered to prove consent.”119   
In a small concession, the new regulations allow that on request of either party, 
                                                                                                     
 109.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Tang, Three Reasons Why Betsy DeVos’s Proposed Title IX Rules Would 
Hurt Survivors, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Nov. 16, 2018), https://nwlc.org/blog/three-reasons-why-
betsy-devoss-draft-title-ix-rules-would-hurt-survivors/ [https://perma.cc/AH3X-WRXJ]; Victoria Yuen 
& Osub Ahmed, 4 Ways Secretary DeVos’ Proposed Title IX Rule Will Fail Survivors of Campus Sexual 
Assault, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-
postsecondary/news/2018/11/16/461181/4-ways-secretary-devos-proposed-title-ix-rule-will-fail-
survivors-campus-sexual-assault/ [https://perma.cc/YN7Q-DPK3]. 
 110.  34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (2020). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. § 106.45(b)(5)(iv). 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Kristina M. Johnson, Chancellor, SUNY, Comment Letter on Proposed Regulations under Title 
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, at 69 (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.suny.edu/media/suny 
/content-assets/documents/chancellor/SUNY-Chancellor-Johnson-Comment-on-ED-Title-IX-Prop-
Regs.pdf [https://perma.cc/864R-44G6]. 
 117.  FED. R. EVID. 412. 
 118.  34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (2020). 
 119.  Id. 
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the live hearing and adversarial cross-examination may be conducted through the use 
of technology rather than in person.120  Ultimately, though, the intent of the new 
regulations to mandate adversarial cross-examination is clear, as the rule prohibits 
decision-makers from relying on the testimony of any witness who refuses to submit 
to cross-examination.121  As discussed in further detail in Part III, this change is 
particularly controversial and has substantial potential ramifications for both the 
accused and accusers, as well as for educational institutions.   
B. Due Process Rights and School Disciplinary Proceedings 
Both the rhetoric surrounding the new regulations and the regulations 
themselves heavily reference due process to justify the proposed enhanced 
procedural protections.122  Therefore, it is crucial to determine at baseline whether 
these enhanced protections are constitutionally required.  Because public universities 
are constitutionally considered to be government actors, they are required to provide 
procedural due process to students in disciplinary processes.123  Just what that due 
process entails has been the subject of considerable debate, because procedural due 
process protections vary depending upon the particular process in question.124  In the 
school disciplinary setting, the Supreme Court has distinguished between academic 
sanctions and disciplinary proceedings, requiring greater procedural protections for 
the latter.125  However, the Court has been careful to consider the unique nature of 
the educational environment and the interplay between that environment and the 
structure of proceedings, noting that “[t]he educational process is not by nature 
adversar[ial]”126 such that importing adversarial judicial processes is inherently in 
tension with the goals of the educational system.   
                                                                                                     
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. (“If a party or witness does not submit to cross-examination at the live hearing, the decision-
maker(s) must not rely on any statement of that party or witness in reaching a determination regarding 
responsibility . . . .”). 
 122.  Press Release Nov. 16, 2018, supra note 103 (“The Department’s proposed rule . . . ensures that 
due process protections are in place for all students.”). 
 123.  U.S. CONST. amends. V & VIII.  Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized the 
constitutionally protected property and/or liberty interests implicated by university disciplinary 
proceedings, courts and commentators have widely assumed that “[t]here are protected liberty interests 
and protected property interests in the educational context for accused students,” which include 
“‘pursuing an education,’ a reputational interest, and an interest in preserving future opportunities” in 
the property interest category as well as the risk of suspension or expulsion in the liberty interest 
category.  Mann, supra note 10, at 647-48; see also Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 
1988) (“[A] student facing expulsion or suspension from a public [post-secondary] educational 
institution is entitled to the protections of due process.”); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 
150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961) (“Surely no one can question that the right to remain at the college in which the 
plaintiffs were students in good standing is an interest of extremely great value.”).  But see Norris v. 
Montgomery Cnty. Cmty. Coll., No. 15-4741, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61506, at *8-10 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 
2016) (“[T]here is no fundamental right to continued college enrollment[,]” and even if a contractual 
right exists to continued enrollment, that does not make the right constitutional.). 
 124.  Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 (1978) (“[W]e have frequently 
emphasized that ‘[t]he very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures 
universally applicable to every imaginable situation.’” (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 
886, 895 (1961))). 
 125.  Id. at 87-89. 
 126.  Id. at 90. 
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In Goss v. Lopez, a case addressing short-term suspension from secondary 
school for disciplinary reasons, the Supreme Court held that “[a]t the very minimum 
. . . students facing suspension and the consequent interference with a protected 
property interest must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of 
hearing.”127  Potential procedural protections that must be included in this hearing 
have been debated by both courts and commentators and include:  whether students 
have a right to representation by counsel in school disciplinary proceedings;128 
whether the appropriate standard of review for Title IX grievance procedures should 
be preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence;129 and whether 
the accused student is entitled, either himself or through his representative, to directly 
cross-examine witnesses against him.130  As detailed in the following section, the 
debate over whether adversarial cross-examination is constitutionally required in 
Title IX grievance procedures has culminated in a circuit split.   
C. Cross-Examination: An Engine for Truth? 
In criminal trials, the right to adversarial cross-examination stems both from the 
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and procedural due process guarantees 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.131  In civil trials and administrative hearings “where 
important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to 
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”132  In these proceedings, cross-
examination serves as a “testing mechanism” in which “the cross-examiner delves 
into word meaning, truthfulness, memory, and perception” to enable the fact-finder 
to determine the truth of what happened in a contested matter.133   
Proponents of adversarial cross-examination argue that it incomparably protects 
                                                                                                     
 127.  419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (emphasis added). 
 128.  See, e.g., Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[W]e do not think [a student] is 
entitled to be represented in the sense of having a lawyer who is permitted to examine or cross-examine 
witnesses, to submit and object to documents, to address the tribunal, and otherwise to perform the 
traditional function of a trial lawyer.”); Gorman, 837 F.2d at 16 (“[T]he weight of authority is against 
representation by counsel at disciplinary hearings, unless the student is also facing criminal charges 
stemming from the incident in question.”). 
 129.  Compare Jennifer James, Comment, We Are Not Done: A Federally Codified Evidentiary 
Standard is Necessary for College Sexual Assault Adjudication, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 1321, 1336 (2016) 
(“[P]reponderance of the evidence provides a better safeguard for an equitable implementation of rights 
between the victim and the accused” than other evidentiary standards), with Barclay Sutton Hendrix, A 
Feather on One Side, a Brick on the Other: Tilting the Scale Against Males Accused of Sexual Assault in 
Campus Disciplinary Proceedings, 47 GA. L. REV. 591, 612 (2013) (arguing that because students 
accused of sexual violence are facing sanctions which would damage their reputations, the clear and 
convincing standard must be applied in these cases), and Henrick, supra note 82, at 65 (“[T]here is 
nothing about insisting on more proof that is tantamount to calling complainants liars.  Instead, a higher 
burden reflects the necessity of certainty before convicting an accused student of the highly stigmatizing 
offense of sexual assault.”). 
 130.  Samantha Harris & KC Johnson, Campus Courts in Court: The Rise in Judicial Involvement in 
Campus Sexual Misconduct Adjudications, 22 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 111 (2019) (“[D]ue 
process suggests that public universities must provide a hearing that allows for cross-examination by the 
accused or his/her advocate.”). 
 131.  Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405-06 (1965). 
 132.  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). 
 133.  Christopher B. Mueller, Cross-Examination Earlier or Later: When Is It Enough to Satisfy 
Crawford?, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 319, 321-22 (2007). 
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the rights of the accused by allowing the fact-finder to get to the ultimate truth of the 
contested matter.134  These arguments draw on Supreme Court jurisprudence touting 
cross-examination as “the principal means by which the believability of a witness 
and the truth of his testimony are tested.”135  The Court has noted that “cross-
examination has always been considered a most effective way to ascertain truth” 
when there are competing narratives that a court must untangle.136  This is 
accomplished not only through the answers provided by an adverse witness, but also 
by “permit[ting] the [fact-finder] that is to decide the defendant’s fate to observe the 
demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the [fact-finder] in 
assessing his credibility.”137  In the criminal context, the Court has noted that cross-
examination “ensur[es] that evidence admitted against an accused is reliable and 
subject to the rigorous adversarial testing that is the norm of Anglo-American legal 
proceedings.”138   
In the context of school disciplinary proceedings institutions must wrestle with 
unique factors that complicate the value of cross-examination.139  Accused students 
rely on the traditional notion of cross-examination as “the greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of truth”140 to “argue that their ability to adequately 
present their cases and challenge the charges against them depends on their ability to 
conduct adversarial cross-examination of their accusers.”141  Additionally, some 
proponents of cross-examination in campus sexual assault cases argue that because 
these adjudications may yield evidence that could be used in future criminal 
prosecutions, the record will not be reliable or complete if cross-examination is not 
permitted.142  On the other side, advocates for sexual assault survivors “argue that 
this process is unnecessarily adversarial in the education context, other processes are 
available that do not expose the victim to further trauma, and adversarial cross-
examination would discourage them from proceeding with claims within their 
institution.”143   
1. Rape Myths and the Dark Side of Cross-Examination 
a. Rape Myths and Campus Sexual Assault 
Rape myths comprise widely held societal beliefs that fuel rape culture and 
                                                                                                     
 134.  J. Brad Reich, When Is Due Process Due?: Title IX, “The State,” and Public College and 
University Sexual Violence Procedures, 11 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2017). 
 135.  Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). 
 136.  Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981). 
 137.  California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). 
 138.  Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990). 
 139.  Mann, supra note 10, at 657. 
 140.  5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (James H. 
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 141.  Mann, supra note 10, at 657. 
 142.  Reich, supra note 134, at 48-49.  Given that only a tiny percentage of campus sexual assault 
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assault out of every 1,000 will be referred to a prosecutor for trial.  See RAINN, Campus Sexual 
Violence, supra note 46 and accompanying text.  
 143.  Mann, supra note 10, at 657. 
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excuse male sexual aggression.144  These “stereotypes and myths—defined as 
prejudicial, stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rapists”145 are 
widely accepted and their internalization and subsequent pushback against them have 
informed the development of criminal law on sexual assault.146  Compelling results 
from multiple “psychology experiments indicates that various rape myths and other 
sexist stereotypes play a vital role in determining whether and how much the victim 
is held responsible.”147  When the victim is held more responsible, the perpetrator is 
correspondingly often relieved of culpability.148   
In the criminal context, “victims in sexual assault cases frequently encounter 
hostile prosecutors and judges who continue to hold ‘deeply held stereotypes and 
misconceptions [which] can undermine fairness in the court systems, especially in 
cases where the victim and perpetrator know each other, which are the vast majority 
of cases.’”149  These myths also inform university responses to sexual assault and 
bolster calls for the increasing criminalization of the campus adjudication process.150   
                                                                                                     
 144.  Kimberly Peterson, Victim or Villain?: The Effects of Rape Culture and Rape Myths on Justice 
for Rape Victims, 53 VAL. U. L. REV. 467, 470 (2019).  There is perhaps no clearer example of the 
prevalence and persistence of rape culture than the sexual assault of a sixteen-year-old girl by multiple 
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The potency and prevalence of rape myths and their impact on both the discourse 
surrounding and actual processes of sexual assault adjudications looms large over 
debates about adversarial cross-examination.  Specifically, one of the most 
prominent rape myths instructs that “victims often lie about being raped.”151  This 
myth is often interwoven with calls for enhanced due process protections for accused 
parties, including a demand for direct, adversarial cross-examination, because it is 
the pernicious idea that victims of sexual assault are lying that provides a sense of 
urgency for cross-examination.152  This myth was historically rationalized by an 
underlying belief that women who were “unchaste” were liars, such that evidence of 
a rape victim’s promiscuity provided the rationalization to determine her complaint 
was false.153   
The second myth, that of the lying woman who cries rape, “continues to be a 
pervasive and insidious part of the sexual assault dialogue on and off campus.”154  
Although statistics on sexual assault are difficult to compile because the majority are 
never reported,155 of reported sexual assaults, the false report rate is only 2%-10%.156  
This number includes cases that are determined to be unfounded; an unfounded case 
is not necessarily one determined to be false but rather signifies that police “conclude 
that it is unverifiable, not serious, or not prosecutable.”157  This category groups 
together several disparate reasons why a case may not proceed, many of which are 
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unrelated to false reporting.158  Nonetheless, the myth that women lie about being 
raped persists.159  Although “a recent ten-year study of sexual assault reports taken 
on a college campus [revealed that] only [5.9%] of cases met criteria to be classified 
as false allegations,” a group of male college athletes “reported that [50%] of rapes 
were invented by women or that women ‘often’ lied about being sexually 
victimized.”160  This myth fuels the urgency of the perceived need for cross-
examination; if you believe that women are likely to be lying about sexual assault, 
the need to challenge their testimonies despite the potential costs seems logical.   
Unfortunately, “many people still believe that women who dress and behave in 
sexual ways deserve to be raped,”161 and that “victims invite rape by their behaviors 
and actions.”162  This myth holds that women who have in some way asked for their 
assaults—through wearing provocative clothing, being intoxicated, or showing some 
level of interest in the man who ultimately assaulted them—were in essence 
contributorily negligent and therefore their perpetrators’ responsibility should be 
diminished.163  This myth is frequently invoked in the context of campus sexual 
assaults.164  For example, a defense attorney for the alleged perpetrator in a recent 
Yale campus rape case that was criminally prosecuted explained his aggressive 
cross-examination of the victim’s behavior as follows:   
“If you flirt with somebody, you have a little bit too much to drink, you invite him 
back to your room, and you’re wearing provocative clothing, don’t be surprised if 
the individual looking at you is going to be provoked,” he added.  “People need to 
take responsibility for the signals they send.  All this outrage about the questions I 
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asked is really ridiculous.  You don’t get a free pass just because you claim to be a 
victim.”165 
Aya Gruber argues that this rape myth has worked to effectively import the tort 
defense of contributory negligence into rape cases, working to undermine the 
credibility of victim witnesses.166  This has been documented in campus hearings as 
well, when narratives are deployed to “diminish the responsibility of the respondent, 
or even claim the respondent is the real victim, by stating that both parties were 
drinking alcohol or that both parties are equally responsible for participating in 
nonconsensual sex.”167  Couched in terms of furthering gender parity, this narrative 
“ignor[es] current research on campus serial rapists (or ‘target rapists’) who 
deliberately use alcohol as a tool to incapacitate victims to sexually assault them as 
part of a continuum of instrumental violence.”168  
b. Weaponization of Rape Myths Through Cross-Examination  
and the Emergence of Rape Shield Laws 
Cross-examination “emerged as a response . . . to perjury”169 and has been 
lauded as the best way for fact-finders to assess credibility of witnesses to come to 
an ultimate conclusion regarding disputed facts.170  However, in sexual assault cases, 
cross-examination has a dark history of being weaponized by defense lawyers to 
discredit sexual assault victims in such a humiliating fashion that the process 
operates as a “second rape.”171  Complainants were routinely subjected to highly 
intrusive questions about their sexual histories aimed to portray them as promiscuous 
women who could not possibly be victims of sexual assault.172  This practice was so 
effective, and so devastating to sexual assault prosecutions, that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence were updated to include the so-called rape shield rules to mitigate against 
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the weaponization of rape myths in cross-examination.173  Speaking in support of 
passage of the federal rape shield rule, then-Senator Joe Biden remarked: 
The enactment of this legislation will eliminate the traditional defense strategy. . .  
of placing the victim and her reputation on trial in lieu of the defendant [and] end 
the practice . . . wherein rape victims are bullied and cross-examined about their 
prior sexual experience[, making] the trial almost as degrading as the rape itself.174   
These rape shield laws, first promulgated in the Federal Rules of Evidence175 
and subsequently modified and adopted by all fifty states,176 were “designed to 
protect complainants from broad defense inquiries into the complainant’s sexual 
history to support a defense of consensual sex.”177  Reformers hoped that the 
adoption of these rules would increase reporting of sexual assault and increase the 
likelihood of convictions in sexual assault cases.178   
The results were mixed.  First, rape shield rules were immediately challenged as 
violating due process by limiting a defendant’s ability to cross-examine his 
accuser.179  The Supreme Court clarified, however, that the right to cross-
examination in criminal cases could be reasonably limited based on the concerns that 
were reflected in rape shield laws.180  State courts have similarly upheld rape shield 
laws in the face of due process challenges.181  However, rape shield laws do contain 
exceptions to protect defendants’ rights, which has fostered unpredictability about 
what evidence will be admitted and what will be excluded.182   
                                                                                                     
 173.  See Marah deMuele, Privacy Protections for the Rape Complainant: Half a Fig Leaf, 80 N.D. 
L. Rev. 145, 147 (2004). 
 174.  124 CONG. REC. 36,256 (1978) (statement of Sen. Biden).  
 175.  See FED. R. EVID. 412. 
 176.  Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 646 (2009). 
 177.  deMuele, supra note 173. 
 178.  Gruber, supra note 176, at 601 (“Reformers argued that shield laws would not only lessen 
victim discomfort, but also prevent juror sexism from influencing verdicts.  They contended that without 
shield laws, jurors would acquit because of distaste for the victim’s lifestyle, the belief that her behavior 
entitled the defendant to sex, or a mistaken perception that past consent implies present consent.”).  
Determining whether admission of evidence barred by rape shield laws results in wrongful acquittals is 
nearly impossible:   
[B]ecause the state cannot appeal an acquittal, when a judge admits a complainant’s sexual 
history and the defendant is wrongly acquitted, the case is not reviewed by a higher court.  
The central problem with admitting a complainant’s unchaste sexual history is the risk it 
poses of leading the decision maker to acquit a defendant unjustly, and yet these cases in 
which such unjust acquittals occur are the most difficult to access and critique.   
Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New 
Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 95 (2002). 
 179.  See Fishman, supra note 153, at 721. 
 180.  Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149 (1991) (“‘[T]rial judges retain wide latitude’ to limit 
reasonably a criminal defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness ‘based on concerns about, among 
other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is 
repetitive or only marginally relevant.’” (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986))). 
 181.  Fishman, supra note 153, at 722 n.42 (providing example cases from multiple states). 
 182.  Bennett Capers, Rape, Truth, and Hearsay, 40 HARV. J.L. & GENDER, 183, 203 (2017) 
(“Nearly forty years after feminists secured passage of the federal rape shield rule and a host of state 
cognates, rape shield laws continue to be problematic, flawed, and—most troubling of all—
unpredictable, especially when it comes to the exception that allows evidence of a complainant’s sexual 
history where doing so is necessary to protect the defendant’s constitutional rights.”). 
150 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1 
Rape shield rules have also been criticized by feminist law reformers.  These 
critics argue that they contain multiple exceptions that effectively allow for the 
weaponization of rape myths despite their protections, particularly because there 
have not been parallel successful efforts to defuse rape myths at other crucial points 
in the adjudication process.183  One of these exceptions, mirrored in the new 
regulations, allows evidence of “specific incidents of the complainant’s sexual 
behavior with respect to the respondent [that is] offered to prove consent.”184  
Michelle Alexander argues that this exception in the federal rape shield rule should 
be abolished because it is based on a flawed rape myth that most rapes are committed 
by strangers, and erroneously suggests both that rape committed by a person with 
whom the victim previously engaged in sexual conduct is less harmful and that 
because a woman has consented to sex with a man once, this consent provides a 
blanket authorization for sex going forward.185  This is particularly relevant in the 
context of Title IX grievance procedures, because approximately 80% of college 
victims know their offenders, and in 24% of cases the victim and offender are 
intimate partners.186 
Additionally, even if evidence prohibited by rape shield rules is properly 
excluded, defense counsel may still accusingly interrogate the complainant about her 
behavior at the time in question, which can leverage rape myths that victims of sexual 
assault contribute to their own victimizations.187  This is, perhaps, less a deficiency 
in the rule and more of an inevitably; as one commentator noted, “it cannot in one 
grand gesture change” tendencies of judge and jury to decide rape cases based on 
myth-based judgments about victims.188   
Most troublingly, though, is that because of the myriad exceptions to rape shield 
laws, and the ability of judges to utilize their discretion to admit otherwise 
impermissible evidence,189 “[r]ape shield laws have been applied haphazardly and 
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inconsistently.”190  Multiple commentators have therefore concluded that “rape 
shield rules have not protected rape victims as hoped.”191   
2. Cross-Examination’s Deficiencies as a Vehicle for Truth-Seeking 
Feminist legal scholars have questioned whether cross-examination actually 
does serve to uncover the truth in sexual assault cases.  First, recent scholarship 
challenges the assumption that fact-finders are accurately able to assess credibility 
based on their perceptions of witnesses’ demeanors.192  Lisa Kern Griffin argues that 
although there is undeniably a valid fairness component to cross-examination, its 
role in assessing credibility is overblown, because, “[a]s the experimental evidence 
indicates, ‘ordinary observers do not benefit from the opportunity to observe 
nonverbal behavior in judging whether someone is lying.’  Moreover, ‘there is little 
correlation between people’s confidence in their ability to detect deception and their 
accuracy.’”193  Griffin argues that, if anything, the belief that a witness’s demeanor 
can serve “as a lie detection tool” for fact-finders actually impedes truth-seeking by 
excluding necessary and reliable testimony.194 
Second, the supposition that cross-examination will yield a truthful account of 
what “really” happened assumes that a witness is purposefully attempting to put forth 
a false narrative in her testimony;195 however, “[t]rauma is known to result in 
inconsistent narratives.”196  For cases that rest upon a determination that either the 
accuser or the accused is telling the truth, but not both, “[r]ecent studies significantly 
indicate that even when people are trying to recall the same memory the content can 
change substantially from one occasion to another.”197  Additionally, “the normal 
variability of memory can be further exacerbated by the impact of trauma, such as 
that experienced by victims of sexual assault.”198  Specifically, “rape memories can 
be ‘less clear and vivid, less visually detailed, less likely to occur in meaningful 
order, less well-remembered, less talked about and less recalled either voluntarily or 
involuntarily.’”199  As a result, an adjudicatory panel aiming to uncover the “truth” 
about what happened in a sexual assault case faces a difficult task, and cross-
examination is unlikely to be the proper tool.   
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D. Cross-Examination Circuit Split 
Cross-examination is raised as a potentially required due process protection in 
the educational context because it is widely considered to be the cornerstone of 
fairness in the criminal justice context, as codified through the Sixth Amendment’s 
right of the accused to directly, or through counsel, examine witnesses against him.200  
Further, because cross-examination is widely considered “the greatest legal engine 
ever invented for the discovery of truth,” it is required in civil trials and many 
administrative hearings.201  Adversarial cross-examination allows the questioner to 
interrogate an adverse witness “under oath, in front of the decision-maker,” and “is 
highly prized in our legal system as a method to test evidence for bias and to test the 
credibility of witnesses.”202  The Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on whether 
due process requires adversarial cross-examination in school disciplinary 
proceedings, and although the circuits were largely in agreement that it was not 
required,203 a recent split has emerged between the First and Sixth Circuits, which, 
in combination with the new regulations requiring cross-examination, makes the 
issue ripe for clarification by the Supreme Court.   
1. Doe v. Baum: Adversarial Cross-Examination is Required in School 
Disciplinary Proceedings 
Jane Roe was part-way through her freshman year at the University of Michigan 
when she met John Doe at a fraternity party.204  At the party, the two drank and 
danced, and after the party ultimately had sex.205  Jane Roe filed a sexual misconduct 
complaint two days later with the University, in which she claimed that she was 
unable to consent because she was too drunk.206  The University responded quickly 
by launching an investigation, which lasted for three months.207  The school utilized 
an investigator who “collected evidence and interviewed Roe, Doe, and twenty-three 
other witnesses.”208   
Two divergent narratives emerged from the investigation; Doe’s story was that 
Roe did not appear to be drunk and affirmatively consented, while Roe told the 
investigator that she told Doe “no sex” before passing out but awoke to find Doe 
performing oral sex on her.209  Although twenty-three other witnesses were 
interviewed, they did not clarify which of the competing stories was accurate, as 
“[a]lmost all of the male witnesses corroborated Doe’s story, and all of the female 
witnesses corroborated Roe’s.”210  Ultimately, the investigator could not find that 
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Roe was so intoxicated that Doe should have been aware that she was unable to 
consent, and recommended that the University “rule in Doe’s favor and close the 
case,” a recommendation that the University followed and Roe appealed.211  The 
University’s Appeals Board then reversed the determination, because “Roe’s 
description of events was ‘more credible’ than Doe’s, and Roe’s witnesses were more 
persuasive.”212  Doe, who was 13.5 credits away from graduating, withdrew from the 
school prior to the sanctioning phase to avoid expulsion.213  Doe brought suit against 
the University, claiming that because credibility was at the heart of the University’s 
decision, due process required that he have the “opportunity to cross-examine Roe 
and adverse witnesses.”214  The District Court granted the University’s motion to 
dismiss, and Doe appealed that decision to the Sixth Circuit.215   
With Doe v. Baum, the Sixth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to 
hold that either the accused or his agent must have the opportunity to directly cross-
examine the accuser and adversarial witnesses when a school disciplinary proceeding 
turns upon the credibility of the two parties.216  Previously, in Flaim v. Medical 
College of Ohio, the Sixth Circuit held that cross-examination in school disciplinary 
processes is not always required, particularly if the accused student was “given 
adequate opportunity to address any discrepancies in [testimony offered against him] 
during the hearing, [such that] ‘cross-examination would have been a fruitless 
exercise.’”217  But, in dicta, the Flaim court carved out space for a potential 
requirement of cross-examination in cases that turned on a credibility determination 
between accuser and accused.218   
In 2017, the Sixth Circuit addressed this in a school disciplinary case involving 
sanctions imposed against two male students charged with separate incidents of 
sexually assaulting female students, setting the stage for its later holding in Baum.219  
In Doe v. University of Cincinnati, the court wrote that in cases where a credibility 
determination is central to the ultimate decision, a university’s procedures must be 
sufficient “to make ‘issues of credibility and truthfulness . . . clear to the decision 
makers.’”220  The court acknowledged that “strengthening those procedures is not 
without consequences for victims,” as cross-examination conducted by the alleged 
perpetrator “‘may be traumatic or intimidating, thereby possibly escalating or 
perpetuating’ the same hostile environment Title IX charges universities with 
eliminating.”221  Nonetheless, it ultimately concluded that because the accused 
student was not asking to directly cross-examine the accusing student, this concern 
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was sufficiently mitigated.222   
In Doe v. Baum, the Sixth Circuit noted that Doe, and any other student facing 
school discipline for sexual misconduct, had substantial interests at stake in both his 
reputation and his future educational and employment opportunities.223  
Additionally, the court highlighted that the University of Michigan “already provides 
for a hearing with cross-examination in all misconduct cases other than those 
involving sexual assault,” such that requiring cross-examination in sexual 
misconduct hearings would in no way add to the administrative burden.224  The court 
did not find persuasive the university’s argument that it was sufficient that Doe was 
given an opportunity to review Roe’s statement in advance and provide a response 
highlighting her inconsistencies to the investigator, because “[c]ross-examination is 
essential in cases like Doe’s because it does more than uncover inconsistencies—it 
‘takes aim at credibility like no other procedural device.’  Without the back-and-forth 
of adversarial questioning, the accused cannot probe the witness’s story to test her 
memory, intelligence, or possible ulterior motives.”225  Rather than relying on 
empirical studies, the court cited to A Few Good Men and My Cousin Vinny to show 
how crucial cross-examination is to the administration of justice.226   
Although the court briefly acknowledged the university’s concern that 
adversarial cross-examination in sexual misconduct cases “may subject an alleged 
victim to further harm or harassment,”227 it quickly dismissed that concern.228  
According to the Sixth Circuit, an agent of the accused could perform the live 
adversarial cross-examination of the accuser, which would “accomplish the benefits 
of cross-examination—its adversarial nature and the opportunity for follow-up—
without subjecting the accuser to the emotional trauma of directly confronting her 
alleged attacker.”229  This reasoning fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the 
emotional trauma wrought by cross-examination.  As detailed above, it is the 
questions, not just the questioner, that are problematic. 
2. Haidak v. University of Massachusetts-Amherst:  Adversarial Cross-
Examination is Not Required in School Disciplinary Proceedings 
 
In 2012, James Haidak and Lauren Gibney were both students at the University 
of Massachusetts, Amherst, and were involved in a romantic relationship.230  
Gibney’s mother reported to the University that Haidak had assaulted Gibney, and 
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in response, the University charged Haidak with physical assault and issued a no-
contact order, which both Haidak and Gibney ignored.231  After two additional no-
contact orders were issued and ignored, the University suspended Haidak pending a 
hearing on the assault charge.232  By the time the hearing was scheduled, Haidak had 
withdrawn from the University.233  Prior to the hearing, the University sent Haidak a 
description of the hearing procedures, which included a newly implemented policy 
“under which charged students could no longer question other students directly, but 
instead could submit proposed questions for the Board to consider posing to the 
witness.”234  
During the hearing, Haidak participated by phone while his attorney was present 
in person (although the attorney’s role was limited to observing and consulting with 
Haidak), and Gibney was present in person.235  The Board conducted all questioning 
of witnesses, and “ultimately found Haidak responsible for assault and failure to 
comply with the no-contact orders, but not for endangerment or harassment.”236  The 
Board expelled Haidak based on this finding.237  Haidak appealed the expulsion to 
the University Appeals Board, which upheld the sanction.238  Haidak then filed a 
complaint against the University in federal court alleging violations of his due 
process, equal protection, and Title IX rights.239  The district court granted summary 
judgment for the University and denied for Haidak; Haidak then appealed this 
decision to the First Circuit.240 
In his appeal, Haidak argued that because he was not allowed to cross-examine 
Gibney, he was denied constitutional due process protection in the hearing.241  
Although Haidak recognized that the First Circuit had previously noted that “the 
right to unlimited cross-examination has not been deemed an essential requirement 
of due process in school disciplinary cases,”242 he argued that due process requires 
at least some opportunity for the accused to directly question opposing witnesses 
“whenever a university disciplinary proceeding turns on the witnesses’ 
credibility.”243  Additionally, the court inferred that because Haidak did not 
separately argue that he had a right to legal counsel in the hearing, he must 
necessarily have been arguing that “the accused student must be allowed to question 
such opposing witnesses himself.”244 
The First Circuit ruled against Haidak and held that, in school disciplinary 
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hearings which rely on credibility determinations, the accused does not have the right 
to perform direct cross-examination of witnesses.245  The court came to this 
conclusion because it “doubt[ed] that student-conducted cross-examination would so 
increase the probative value of hearings and decrease the ‘risk of erroneous 
deprivation’” as to make it constitutionally required.246  The First Circuit declined to 
adopt the Sixth Circuit’s holding from Doe v. Baum.247  In contrast to the Sixth 
Circuit, the First Circuit had no qualms about the ability of a neutral party to question 
witnesses, including the accuser, and was concerned that mandating adversarial 
cross-examination would transform school disciplinary proceedings in to a 
“mandated mimicry of a jury-waived trial.”248  Ultimately, the court held that due 
process does not require that a school must “provide for cross-examination by the 
accused or his representative in all cases turning on credibility determinations,” 
holding instead that a neutral party, such as the hearing panel, can question the 
witness. 
The First Circuit bolstered its holding in Haidak by carefully reviewing the 
manner of questioning conducted by the Board during Haidak’s hearing, finding that 
although it was troubling that the Board was not able to see Haidak’s full list of 
questions, “[t]he Board questioned Gibney at length on the matters central to the 
charges.  It probed for detail and required her to clarify ambiguities in her 
responses.”249  Crucially, “[b]y alternating between questioning Haidak and Gibney, 
ultimately examining each student three times, [the Board] engaged in an iterative 
process in which its questioning of Gibney was informed in real time by Haidak’s 
testimony as the proceedings unfolded,” which allowed the Board to elicit critical 
information regarding Gibney’s continued relationship with Haidak after the initial 
assault.250   
The First Circuit’s holding in Haidak is well-supported by other circuits and 
federal district courts which have also held that there is no direct right to cross-
examination in school disciplinary proceedings.251  Courts holding that due process 
does not always require adversarial cross-examination in the school disciplinary 
context base this determination largely on one or more of three strains of reasoning.   
First, and most conservatively, many courts have held that cross-examination is 
not required in the academic context when the adjudication does not turn on the 
credibility of witnesses—namely, in cases where the accused student has admitted 
to the same crucial facts about which the witness he wants to cross-examine would 
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also testify.252  Because Title IX cases are often credibility contests, the dicta in these 
cases indicate that cross-examination in some form may be required.   
Second, courts have held that cross-examination is not required in educational 
disciplinary settings because it is both overly burdensome and potentially harmful to 
the education process.253  In Newsome v. Batavia, the Sixth Circuit held that in school 
disciplinary proceedings where “the veracity of a student account of misconduct by 
another student is initially assessed by a school administrator—who has, or has 
available to him, a particularized knowledge of the student’s trustworthiness,” the 
benefit of cross-examination is outweighed by the “necessity of protecting student 
witnesses from ostracism and reprisal” such that cross-examination of student 
accusers is not required.254  Further, the court held that requiring school disciplinary 
boards to provide for adversarial cross-examination would be too burdensome to be 
mandated because:   
[t]o saddle them with the burden of overseeing the process of cross-examination 
(and the innumerable objections that are raised to the form and content of cross-
examination) is to require of them that which they are ill equipped to perform.  The 
detriment that will accrue to the educational process in general by diverting school 
board members’ and school administrators’ attention from their primary 
responsibilities in overseeing the educational process to learning and applying the 
common law rules of evidence simply outweighs the marginal benefit that will 
accrue to the fact-finding process by allowing cross-examination.255  
Third, multiple courts have emphasized that because educational disciplinary 
proceedings are vastly different from criminal proceedings, cross-examination in 
educational adjudications is not required as long as “basic fairness is preserved”256 
in the proceedings.257  These courts have held that hearings should have the 
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“rudiments of an adversary proceeding”—which includes provision of the names of 
adverse witnesses and an overview of the content of their anticipated testimony to 
the accused student; an opportunity for the accused student to present a defense to 
the adjudicatory board (including oral and/or written testimony from witnesses); and, 
ultimately, provision of a report to the accused student detailing the reasons for the 
board’s findings—but does not include requiring the cross-examination of adverse 
witnesses.258  When determining that expelled students have a due process right to 
notice and a hearing prior to expulsion, the Fifth Circuit was careful to note that 
“[t]his is not to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-
examine witnesses, is required.  Such a hearing, with the attending publicity and 
disturbance of college activities, might be detrimental to the college’s educational 
atmosphere and impractical to carry out.”259   
Over twenty-five years later, the Eleventh Circuit drew upon the Fifth Circuit’s 
recognition in Dixon that the crucial differences between educational and criminal 
proceedings give rise to different due process rights.  In Nash v. Auburn, the Eleventh 
Circuit differentiated educational settings from both criminal proceedings and 
formalized quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, because although “[d]ue 
process requires that appellants have the right to respond, . . . their rights in the 
academic disciplinary process are not co-extensive with the rights of litigants in a 
civil trial or with those of defendants in a criminal trial.”260  In Nash, even though 
the expelled students were not permitted to cross-examine adverse witnesses when 
doing so would have been valuable to their defense, their due process rights were not 
violated because they were afforded other procedural protections.261   
Additionally, many courts have held, like the Haidak court, that even if some 
form of cross-examination of witnesses in Title IX grievance procedures is required 
to conform with due process, this cross-examination does not need to be adversarial 
and can instead be conducted by a neutral party.  These courts blend the above three 
approaches, recognizing that (1) Title IX cases often do rest upon a credibility 
determination of the accuser and accused which warrants some level of cross-
examination; (2) the educational context is ill-served by requiring laypersons to 
follow technical legal procedures that govern adversarial cross-examination and 
which undermine the core tenets of education; and (3) traditional adversarial cross-
examination is not required by due process in adjudicatory proceedings where basic 
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fundamental fairness is preserved.262  As discussed further in Part III, some of these 
courts also recognize that adversarial cross-examination “‘may be traumatic or 
intimidating, thereby possibly escalating or perpetuating’ the same hostile 
environment Title IX charges universities with eliminating.”263   
III: ADVERSARIAL CROSS-EXAMINATION IS NOT REQUIRED BY DUE PROCESS, AND 
UNDERMINES THE MANDATE OF TITLE IX 
A. Adversarial Cross-Examination Will Deter Reporting and Harm Accusers, in 
Violation of Title IX 
A majority of schools do not publish their specific procedures for handling 
sexual assault adjudications, but recent research suggests that, in the wake of the 
2011 DCL, “most schools err on the side of disallowing [adversarial] cross-
examination.”264  This would drastically change, though, with the new regulations’ 
requirement of a live hearing with adversarial cross-examination for Title IX 
grievance procedures.   
Adversarial cross-examination can be deeply damaging to victims of sexual 
assault because it can lead to further trauma and shame.265  We know from the 
criminal context that “[w]omen’s descriptions of their injury also make clear that the 
dignitary harms associated with having sex expropriated against one’s will are 
inexorably aggravated by traditional criminal law process.  Effective adversarial 
hearings are designed to make witnesses uncomfortable, uncertain, and, often, 
ashamed.”266  In her searing victim impact statement, Chanel Miller wrote of her 
experience in the adversarial legal system:   
I was pummeled with narrowed, pointed questions that dissected my personal life, 
love life, past life, family life, inane questions, accumulating trivial details to try and 
find an excuse for this guy who didn’t even take the time to ask me for my name, 
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who had me naked a handful of minutes after seeing me.  After a physical assault, I 
was assaulted with questions designed to attack me, to say see, her facts don’t line 
up, she’s out of her mind, she’s practically an alcoholic, she probably wanted to 
hook up, he’s like an athlete right, they were both drunk, whatever, the hospital stuff 
she remembers is after the fact, why take it into account, Brock has a lot at stake so 
he’s having a really hard time right now.267   
Putting students through this process, particularly if it is unlikely to help the 
adjudicatory panel make its ultimate determination, does not further the due process 
rights of accused students and puts universities in a position of potentially subjecting 
complainants to a hostile environment—the very situation Title IX is supposed to 
address.268  It is for this reason that the 2011 DCL strongly discouraged schools from 
utilizing adversarial cross-examination during hearings, because “[a]llowing an 
alleged perpetrator to question an alleged victim directly may be traumatic or 
intimidating, thereby possibly escalating or perpetuating a hostile environment.”269  
In response to the Department of Education’s proposed regulations, over 900 mental 
health professionals submitted a comment decrying the new rules and arguing that 
“the proposed changes would exacerbate psychological harms to victims.”270   
Critics of the new regulations argue that the cross-examination requirement, in 
addition to other components of the new regulations that bolster the rights of accused 
students, will act to deter reporting of campus sexual assault.271  Eliza Lehner traced 
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how retellings of “brutal cross-examination” in “he said, she said” cases beginning 
at the outset of police investigations of rape complaints serves to “effectively 
discourage victims from reporting and pursuing their rape allegations in large part 
because they concern victims who are already particularly susceptible to 
discouragement.”272  Campus sexual assault complainants, too, could be dissuaded 
from reporting if they are repeatedly exposed to (truthful) messages that the cross-
examination they will have to undergo during the grievance procedure will be 
harrowing. 
Additionally, if adversarial cross-examination is required then issues of 
representation by counsel are inevitable.  The new regulations note that restrictions 
on the participation of an advisor to either party be applied equally, but do not require 
parity in representation by counsel across parties.273  This is a departure from the 
2011 DCL, which explicitly noted that “if a school chooses to allow the parties to 
have their lawyers participate in the proceedings, it must do so equally for both 
parties.”274  
Critics of the new regulations point out that although “[w]ealthy students will 
be free to hire high-priced lawyers to represent them,” many students will only be 
able to rely on an advisor appointed by the college who may not be an attorney.275  
This outcome is particularly troubling given the new requirement of adversarial 
cross-examination, as the complexities of cross-examination in sexual assault cases 
are legion, and even highly experienced ethical criminal defense attorneys wrestle 
with how to effectively cross-examine sexual assault victims.276  The rules of 
evidence, and including rape shield laws, are complex and difficult for even 
experienced legal practitioners to understand—it is inconceivable that laypersons 
will be able to follow these rules to conduct effective and ethical cross-examinations 
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about equity for student representation in court-like settings.”). 
 274.  2011 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 12. 
 275.  Glenn C. Altschuler & David Wippman, Proposed Changes to Title IX Will Not Solve the 
Problem of Sexual Assaults on College Campuses, THE HILL (Jan. 5, 2020 12:00PM), https:// 
thehill.com/opinion/education/476814-proposed-changes-to-title-ix-will-not-solve-the-problem-of-
sexual-assaults [https://perma.cc/KHE7-ERH8]; see, e.g., Erin J. Heuring, Til It Happens to You: 
Providing Victims of Sexual Assault with Their Own Legal Representation, 53 IDAHO L. REV. 689, 728-
34 (2018) (arguing that a Special Victims’ Counsel program, mirroring the program that exists in the 
military, should be established for all sexual assault victims in civil cases); Behre, supra note 2, at 324 
(criticizing the criminalization of Title IX procedures while also arguing that a way to mitigate the 
harms of this criminalization to victims is to provide attorneys for accusers in campus sexual assault 
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 276.  See, e.g., Abbe Smith, Representing Rapists: The Cruelty of Cross Examination and Other 
Challenges for a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255 (2016).  
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in an educational adjudicatory setting.277   
B. Adversarial Cross-Examination Undermines Title IX’s Mandate  
Because the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the specific contours of due 
process requirements for Title IX proceedings, the most instructive case for 
determining properprocedural safeguards is Mathews v. Eldridge.  In this case, the 
Court set out a three-factor test to determine whether due process requires 
implementation of a specific procedural protection.278  First, the private interest that 
will be impacted must be identified; second, the risk that this interest would be 
erroneously deprived through the existing procedures used must be assessed; and 
third, “the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail” needs to be considered.279  Ultimately, due process requires that “a 
person in jeopardy of a serious loss (be given) notice of the case against him and 
opportunity to meet it.”280  The question at issue here is whether procedural due 
process requires adversarial cross-examination to ensure that an accused student 
receives “a meaningful opportunity to present their case.”281 
The first Mathews factor requires identification of “the private interest that will 
be affected by the official action.”282  Title IX grievance procedures, as school 
disciplinary proceedings, “have neither the consequences nor weight of a criminal 
conviction.”283  Given that context, though, students accused of sexual misconduct 
face serious disciplinary consequences if they are found to be responsible for the 
                                                                                                     
 277.  Johnson, supra note 116, at 654 (“Cross-examination may or may not be the ‘greatest legal 
engine,’ but it is doubtful that Dean Wigmore was imagining that such cross-examination would be 
conducted by an untrained 19-year-old friend of the party.  Whatever gain to truth-seeking the 
Department imagines would occur with genteel attorneys ethically asking probing questions is sure to be 
outweighed by the grave trauma and harm caused by unskilled advisors ‘playing attorney’ while likely 
elucidating few, if any, facts that could not have been learned in a less adversarial, more educational 
manner.”). 
 278.  Although Mathews was specifically regarding due process in administrative proceedings, the 
test emerging from the case is widely used as the standard for assessing whether procedural safeguards 
in a range of non-criminal proceedings, including school disciplinary proceedings, meet due process 
requirements.  See, e.g., Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying the Mathews 
test to determine that although a sixty-day football suspension had a substantial impact on the student, 
the governmental interests in efficiently maintaining order and discipline in the school and the fact that 
implementing more formal hearing processes including cross examination and representation by counsel 
would “not sufficiently increase the reliability and fairness of the process to warrant the additional 
expense and disruption of the educational process,” the school’s provision of notice and an informal 
hearing met the Goss minimum requirements and satisfied due process); Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 
F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 2017) (reasoning that, under the second Mathews prong, “[a] finding of 
responsibility for a sexual offense can have a ‘lasting impact’ on a student’s personal life, in addition to 
his ‘educational and employment opportunities,’ especially when the disciplinary action involves a long-
term suspension.  The ‘private interest that will be affected by the official action’ is therefore 
compelling.”). 
 279.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). 
 280.  Id. at 348-49 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951)). 
 281.  Id. at 349. 
 282.  Id. at 335. 
 283.  Margo Kaplan, Restorative Justice and Campus Sexual Misconduct, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 701, 727 
(2017). 
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charged conduct, up to and including expulsion.284  Because suspension and 
expulsion both interrupt, and potentially cease, a student’s ability to attend the 
university of their choice, these sanctions implicate a significant private interest.  To 
that end, some measure of due process protection is required in these 
adjudications.285   
Additionally, commentators argue that accused students also have a serious 
reputational interest at stake:  if they are found to have committed sexual misconduct, 
they will be effectively labeled as sex offenders, which could jeopardize their 
abilities to transfer to new institutions and potentially obtain employment in their 
desired fields.286  The Sixth Circuit found this argument compelling, determining that 
“the effect of a finding of responsibility for sexual misconduct on ‘a person’s good 
name, reputation, honor, or integrity’ is profound.”287  This factor establishes that 
some measure of due process protection is required, but does not directly speak to 
the necessity, or lack thereof, of adversarial cross-examination in grievance 
procedures.   
The second Mathews factor examines “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” 288  Accused students and their 
advocates argue that the risk of erroneous deprivation of their interest in continued 
enrollment and risk of lasting reputational damage is high if adversarial cross-
examination is not used.289  This argument is undermined by the evidence that under 
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Reputation-Damaging College Issues, YOU(ONLINE) (Feb. 1, 2020), https://reputation-
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[https://perma.cc/5FTV-QANP]. 
 287.  Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 600 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 288.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 289.  KC Johnson, Title IX Has a Cross-Examination Crisis, MINDING THE CAMPUS (Feb. 27, 2019), 
https://www.mindingthecampus.org/2019/02/27/title-ix-has-a-cross-examination-crisis/ 
[https://perma.cc/U64N-NQH8] (characterizing arguments against adversarial cross-examination as 
“accepting one assumption: that all, or nearly all, campus allegations are true, and so a system primarily 
designed to test the veracity of each individual claim is not only unnecessary but counterproductive”). 
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current procedures any serious penalty for campus sexual misconduct is rare—let 
alone an erroneous imposition of such penalties.  Although expulsion is a potential 
sanction, it is rarely applied.290  According to Department of Justice data, the most 
common sanction for campus sexual assault is suspension, not expulsion, and the 
combined numbers of reprimands and requirements for counseling far exceed the 
number of expulsions.291  After a year-long investigation of campus sexual assault, 
the Center for Public Integrity found that “[i]t was far more common for the alleged 
victim to drop out or transfer, while the accused student remained on campus.”292   
Under the second prong of this factor, the probable value of the additional 
safeguard of adversarial cross-examination is low.  If anything, adversarial cross-
examination is likely to undermine the legitimacy of Title IX hearings, particularly 
in the form mandated by the new regulations.  If adversarial cross-examination is 
relied upon, because of the real risk that rape myths will be harmfully leveraged 
through the questioning to inappropriately cast doubt on the accuser’s credibility, the 
accuracy of proceedings could be decreased while harm to the accuser is increased.  
Further, the process “becomes far less sturdy” if non-attorney advocates are the 
individuals conducting the cross-examination.293  As the First Circuit noted, 
“[c]onsiderable anecdotal experience suggests that cross-examination in the hands 
of an experienced trial lawyer is an effective tool,”294 but it does not follow that a 
lay-person would be equally capable of conducting effective cross-examination.  The 
only way to ensure that adversarial cross-examination in this setting functions as it 
does in the criminal and civil context, where it has established its reputation as an 
engine for truth-seeking, would be to essentially “turn campus hearings into 
courtroom proceedings.”295   
The form of adversarial cross-examination imposed by the new regulations also 
poses considerable potential harm to accused students.  Because an institution is 
prohibited under these regulations from considering any statements from a party who 
does not submit to adversarial cross-examination during the live hearing,296 an 
accused student who chooses not to testify at the hearing out of concern that his 
statements could be used against him in either a concurrent or future criminal 
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proceeding effectively loses his ability to mount a defense to the charges against him.   
Finally, under the third factor, the government’s interest as relates to the specific 
function in question “and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail” must be examined.297  To this end, 
the government’s interest, as embodied by the public university, is to adhere to the 
mandate of Title IX by ensuring that students have equal access to education free 
from sex discrimination while ensuring fair disciplinary proceedings for students 
accused of misconduct.  This is a strong interest, which cannot be ascribed to either 
side as the university must attend to the needs of both accused and accusing students.  
Therefore, the crucial portion of the analysis under this factor is the fiscal and 
administrative burden that requiring an across-the-board requirement of adversarial 
cross-examination would impose.   
The cost to public universities of requiring adversarial cross-examination in 
Title IX hearings would be substantial.  First, this procedure would greatly 
incentivize accused students to retain counsel if they have the financial means to do 
so.  Because it would be fundamentally unfair for only an accused student to be 
represented by counsel, this procedure would require universities to either provide 
counsel for accusing students or prohibit the participation of counsel in the 
adversarial cross-examination altogether.  Adversarial cross-examination is most 
useful as a truth-seeking endeavor when skilled attorneys are conducting the 
examinations and experienced judges are ensuring that rape shield limitations are 
followed.  Without bringing attorneys into these proceedings for the benefit of both 
accused and accusing students, as well as for the adjudicatory board itself, it is likely 
that adversarial cross-examination would yield only downsides and no benefits.  The 
administrative burdens, too, would be immense.  If the fiscal burden of providing 
attorneys for one or both parties as well as to advise the board is too steep, then 
universities would face a substantial administrative burden.  Campus adjudicatory 
boards would need to become experts in effective cross-examination techniques and 
rape shield laws to ensure that the adversarial cross-examination is as accurate and 
useful as possible without harming accusing students.   
Courts have warned against “undue judicialization of an administrative hearing, 
particularly in an academic environment,” because it “may result in an improper 
allocation of resources, and prove counter-productive.”298  Requiring adversarial 
cross-examination in Title IX hearings would inherently change the nature of these 
campus proceedings, turning them into highly judicialized mini-trials.  This would 
place a substantial financial and administrative burden on institutions, and thus this 
factor too militates against requiring adversarial cross-examination.  Therefore, 
under the Mathews factors, adversarial cross-examination in Title IX hearings is not 
required to satisfy due process.   
                                                                                                     
 297.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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C. Indirect Cross-Examination Meets Both Sides’ Needs 
Adversarial cross-examination in Title IX hearings presents real harms to 
victims and undermines the fundamental goals of Title IX by further subjecting 
sexual assault victims to a hostile environment.  Finally, because it is ill-suited to 
sexual misconduct cases, it is not likely to serve as a vehicle for truth-seeking.  
Instead, it threatens to taint outcomes of proceedings by allowing for the 
weaponization of rape myths—obscuring, rather than revealing, any true answers 
about what happened between the parties.   
However, cross-examination is not without its merits.  Accused students have 
the right to defend themselves, and, particularly when an adjudicatory panel is tasked 
with making a credibility determination, witnesses on both sides of the argument 
should be questioned to ensure that the fact-finders can make an informed and 
reasoned decision.  This does not require adversarial cross-examination, though.  
Instead, and as noted by the Haidak court, an adjudicatory panel can serve as an 
intermediary for cross-examination, vetting questions in advance and posing them to 
witnesses.  Even if a live hearing is required, this can be conducted with the witnesses 
in different locations, using video technology.  Alternatively, more schools could 
adopt the independent investigator model, wherein a neutral outside expert 
investigator conducts a thorough investigation of the complaint—including 
conducting thorough witness interviews—and then prepares a detailed report for the 
adjudicatory board.  Both the accused and accusing parties could submit cross-
examination questions to the investigator who could assess and pose the questions 
most likely to shed light on credibility and any factual disputes.   
This indirect, less-adversarial mode of cross-examination continues to protect 
accused students from being subjected to serious disciplinary sanctions without 
fundamentally fair procedures.  Additionally, it recognizes and respects that 
adversarial cross-examination has great potential to both directly harm complainants 
through re-traumatizing them in the process of questioning and deter future students 
from reporting out of fear of being subjected to this process.   
CONCLUSION 
Requiring that universities implement direct adversarial cross-examination will 
not provide due process protection for accused students, because, in cases turning 
upon issues of consent and intoxication, it is unlikely that cross-examination could 
ever uncover a neutral “truth.”  Further, because of the troubling ways in which rape 
narratives can be effectively wielded in cross-examination despite the rape shield 
rule, and because the adjudicators in the educational context will be laypersons rather 
than skilled courtroom attorneys and judges, there is an unacceptably high chance 
that cross-examination in the Title IX context will itself create a hostile environment 
for students.  Although the Department of Education cited confusion among 
universities about how to comply with Title IX as a motivating factor in 
promulgating the new regulations, these new rules will only heighten confusion.  The 
circuit split, too, creates uncertainty that must be resolved.   
Judicially, the Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split to hold that due 
process does not require adversarial cross-examination in school disciplinary 
proceedings, upholding the First Circuit’s determination that indirect cross-
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examination in this context is sufficient.  Additionally, either legislative or agency 
action will be needed to revoke the new regulations and promulgate new, more 
appropriate regulations that are fair to all parties.  Updated Title IX regulations that 
carry the force of law are necessary, but, when promulgated, cannot mandate 
adversarial cross-examination for Title IX hearings.  To do so is neither required by 
due process nor in keeping with Title IX’s mandate to eliminate sex-based 
discrimination in education. 
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